People have always been xenophobic, but an explicit philosophical and scientific view of human racial difference only began to emerge during the modern period. Why and how did this happen? Surveying a range of philosophical and natural-scientific texts, dating from the Spanish Renaissance to the German Enlightenment, Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference charts the evolution of the modern concept of race and shows that natural philosophy, particularly efforts to taxonomize and to order nature, played a crucial role. Smith demonstrates how the denial of moral equality between Europeans and non-Europeans resulted from converging philosophical and scientific developments, including a declining belief in human nature's universality and the rise of biological classification. The racial typing of human beings grew from the need to understand humanity within an all-encompassing system of nature, alongside plants, minerals, primates, and other animals. While racial difference as seen through science did not arise in order to justify the enslavement of people, it became a rationalization and buttress for the practices of trans-Atlantic slavery. From the work of François Bernier to G. W. Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, and others, Smith delves into philosophy's part in the legacy and damages of modern racism. With a broad narrative stretching over two centuries, Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference takes a critical historical look at how the racial categories that we divide ourselves into came into being.

Nemesius of Emesa's On Human Nature (De Natura Hominis) is the first Christian anthropology. Written in Greek, circa 390 CE, it was read in half a dozen languages--from Baghdad to Oxford--well into the early modern period. Nemesius' text circulated in two Latin versions in the centuries that saw the rise of European universities, shaping scholastic theories of human nature. During the Renaissance there were numerous print editions helping to inspire a new discourse of human dignity. David Lloyd Dusenbury offers the first monograph in English on Nemesius' treatise. In the interpretation offered here, the Syrian bishop seeks to define the human qua human. His early Christian anthropology is cosmopolitan. He writes, 'Things that are natural are the same for all.' In his pages, a host of texts and discourses--biblical and medical, legal and philosophical--are made to converge upon a decisive tenet of Christian late antiquity: humans' natural freedom. For Nemesius, reason and choice are a divine double-strand of powers. Since he believes that both are a natural human inheritance, he concludes that much is 'in our power'. Nemesius defines humans as the only living beings who are at once ruler (intellect) and ruled (body). Because of this, the human is a 'little world', binding the rationality of angels to the flux of elements, the tranquillity of plants, and the impulsiveness of animals. This compelling study traces Nemesius' reasoning through the whole of On Human Nature, as he seeks to give a long-influential image of humankind both philosophical and anatomical proof.

Human genetic enhancement, examined from the standpoint of the new field of political bioethics, displaces the age-old question of truth: What is human nature? This book displaces that question with another: What kind of human nature should humans want to create for themselves? To answer that question, this book answers two others: What constraints should limit the applications of rapidly developing biotechnologies? What could possibly form the basis for corresponding public policy in a democratic society? Benjamin Gregg focuses on the distinctly political dimensions of human nature, where politics refers to competition among competing values on which to base public policy, legislation, and political culture. This book offers citizens of democratic communities a broad perspective on how they together might best approach urgent questions of how to deal with the socially and morally challenging potential for human genetic engineering.

Humanistisk opgør med de negative myter, der lammer menneskets handlekraft; samt om deres opståen set i historisk, filosofisk/teologisk perspektiv

Human Nature in Modern Economics offers a precise definition of the concept of human nature in economics, something that is so far lacking in the theoretical and methodological literature. This book develops tools for the analysis of human nature through the construction of the author’s meta-model – based on anthropological and psychological foundations – allowing for comparisons of anthropological assumptions made in economic theories. The model demonstrates that the normative functions of human nature may affect the economic reality. The chapters argue that the concept of human nature determines our thinking about the economy and economics, including fundamental methodologies, methods and theories. Thus, the differences between various economic schools may result from the different assumptions of these schools about human nature. Those evolving views of human nature proceed to explain the development of both orthodox (mainstream) and heterodox economics. The book marks a significant addition to the literature on the history of economic thought, heterodox economics, economic theory and economic methodology. For students, it is a supplement to standard textbooks as it explains the current state of economics, especially in its heterodox branches. It will allow scholars to discover the importance of what they assume about human nature and how it may influence their research process.

Provocative essays explore how ideas about human nature inform or shape human understanding of nature and the environment.

This book explores the idea of human nature and the many understandings of it put forward by such diverse figures as Aristotle, Rousseau, Marx, Freud, Darwin, and E.O. Wilson. Each chapter looks at a different theory and offers a concise explanation, assessing the theory's plausibility without forcing it into a mould. Some chapters deal with the ideas of only one thinker, while others (such as the chapters on liberalism and feminism) present a variety of different positions. A clear distinction is made between theories of human nature and the political theories which so often follow from them. For the new edition, Loptson has addressed the new developments in the rapidly expanding genetic and paleontological record, as well as expanded the discussion of the Christian theory of human nature by incorporating the ideas of the Marx scholar and social theorist G.A. Cohen. The new edition has also been substantively revised and updated throughout.

David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This second volume begins with their 'Historical Account' of the Treatise, an account that runs from the beginnings of the work to the period immediately following Hume's death in 1776, followed by an account of the Nortons' editorial procedures and policies and a record of the differences between the first-edition text of the Treatise and the critical text that follows. The volume continues with an extensive set of 'Editors' Annotations', intended to illuminate (though not intepret) Hume's texts; a four-part bibliography of materials cited in both volumes; and a comprehensive index.

Preface Being a human is challenging. Human life is a journey thorough time and space with many obstacles: injury, disease, constant uncertainty, and relentlessly difficult interactions with other humans, Each human is the reincarnation of a long-lineage of ancestors. Species memory, perceptual skills, needs, drives, feelings, desires and behaviors are built in and begin operating in utero. Humans evolved from primate ancestors and retained features of mind and behavior that have been present in animals for hundreds of millions of years. Urges, desires, designs, feelings cry out from within and often surprise us, as if we were the hosts to wild animals and spirits within that refuse to be identified or tamed. Human behavior can be understood in relation to the whole spectrum of primate behaviors and social organizations. Humans appear to have an eclectic combination of primate tendencies with elaboration of features such as tool making, symbolic reasoning and spoken language. Linda Stone suggested that: “Primates are a natural grouping of mammals that includes prosimians, tree-dwelling animals such as lemurs and tarsiers, monkeys, apes, and humans. Some of the physical characteristics that distinguish primates from other mammals are binocular vision and the grasping hand with mobile digits and flat nails. Evolutionary trends characteristic of the Primate Order are most pronounced in humans and include prolongation of gestation of the fetus, prolongation of the period of infant care, and expansion and elaboration of the brain. An important feature in the social life of many nonhuman primates is dominance and the formation of "dominance hierarchies."… a dominant animal wins aggressive encounters with others and usually has greater access to resources such as food, water, or sexual partners.“ Rather than viewing society and culture as real things, an observer can recognize that humans live in groups that repeat and modify innate behaviors to produce prolific variations on a few underlying themes that are common to all societies. A smart observer will consider the grouping characteristics of humans and discern basic patterns and problems underlying the apparent complexity of modern civilization. The organization of society begins with small local clusters that link family groups into clans that are more or less cooperative units. Clans associate, forming bands that tend to affiliate with other bands forming tribes, looser affiliations that occupy larger geographic areas. The band-tribal structure emerges from ancient animal groupings. Patterns of organization, rules, and institutions that regulate human behavior are in flux and will continue to be unstable. As human populations expand and interactions become increasingly complex, innate abilities are stretched and distorted. The ability of individuals to relate to other humans remains limited and limits the effective management of enlarging groups. Managers and leaders do not become smarter as the organizations they lead become larger. It is axiomatic that organizations that exceed a threshold number become dysfunctional. It is matter of empirical study to recognize group size thresholds, and too little is known about the cognitive limitations of leaders.