Arab leaderships have been remarkably stable since the 1970s, particularly given the frequency of military coups in preceding years. Nonetheless, the military remains a key force in most Arab states and political leaders must maintain its loyalty if they are to retain office. Regimes have used a range of methods to ensure the military’s backing: In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak has maintained political control largely through providing the military with private and corporate benefits; selective appointments and institutional checks, are also useful instruments. Tribal relations underpin King Hussein’s political control in Jordan. Transjordanians have not only been the main beneficiaries of political power, but have also occupied the key positions in the armed forces. In Syria, President Hafez al-Assad has built his regime on the Alawi minority, while the vast security apparatus limits the spread of sectarian, class or ideological grievances in the military. President Saddam Hussein has established multiple security agencies in Iraq designed to prevent conspiracies against his regime. Regular rotations and purges ensure that few officers are in place long enough to contemplate, let alone organise, a coup, while the severe punishments meted out to suspected plotters are a further disincentive to rebellion. In this paper, Risa Brooks argues that the need for Arab regimes to maintain political control can undermine the combat potential of their armed forces. Centralising command, creating overlapping commands, politicising selection criteria and authorising involvement in economic activities all potentially compromise military effectiveness. The fact that regimes have successfully managed political–military relations in the past does not mean that they will automatically do so in the future. Changing social or economic conditions could upset the equilibrium in political–military relations. Regime stability cannot therefore be taken for granted Transition to new leadership is a looming issue for the key regimes in Egypt, Syria and Jordan; political–military relations will play a crucial role in how it is resolved. New leaders must gain and maintain social support if they are to consolidate power. The fact that so many Middle Eastern regimes face uncertain transitions raises the sobering prospect of profound instability and change in this strategically vital region. Maintaining political control is a continuous and evolving process. A breakdown in social support for the leadership, failure to detect a conspiracy within the military and economic or political change that threatens military prerogatives could all disrupt political–military relations. Current stability should not give rise to complacency.

"Future-oriented questions are woven through the study and practice of international security. The 48 essays collected in this Handbook use such questions to provide a tour of the most innovative and exciting new areas of research as well as major developments in established lines of inquiry. The results of their efforts are: the definitive statement of the state of international security and the academic field of security studies, a comprehensive portrait of expert assessments of expected developments in international security at the onset of the twenty-first century's second decade, and a crucial staging ground for future research agendas." --Descripción del editor.

The latest volume of the Political and Military Sociology annual review features empirical research on topics that focus on security, military training, culture, and the challenges of bureaucracy, law, and violence in democracies. The articles cover an impressive geographic range from Europe to Africa and to the Middle East.Two essays address threats to democratic polities by corrupt governmental and legal institutions and by electoral violence and intimidation. The first argues that a culture of "dualism" in Greece helps produce problems. The second analyzes the power of military student fraternities in Nigeria, arguing that democracy is threatened by these organizations.Two contributors then address the security and military challenges in Iraq. The first argues that successful military advisors must play dual roles as both peacekeeper-diplomats and warriors. The second poses that Iraqi government policies privileging the Shia population have alienated other groups?and helped support for groups such as ISIS. The final essay analyzes the acculturation of new soldiers to Zimbabwean military life through the training experiences of recruits.The volume also includes reviews of recent books on military and security matters.

Bringing together leading scholars from across the world, this comprehensive Research Handbook analyses key problems, subjects, regions, and countries in civil-military relations. Showcasing cutting-edge research developments, it illustrates the deeply complex nature of the field and analyses important topics in need of renewed consideration.

Creating Military Power examines how societies, cultures, political structures, and the global environment affect countries' military organizations. Unlike most analyses of countries' military power, which focus on material and basic resources—such as the size of populations, technological and industrial base, and GNP—this volume takes a more expansive view. The study's overarching argument is that states' global environments and the particularities of their cultures, social structures, and political institutions often affect how they organize and prepare for war, and ultimately impact their effectiveness in battle. The creation of military power is only partially dependent on states' basic material and human assets. Wealth, technology, and human capital certainly matter for a country's ability to create military power, but equally important are the ways a state uses those resources, and this often depends on the political and social environment in which military activity takes place.

IBSS is the essential tool for librarians, university departments, research institutions and any public or private institution whose work requires access to up-to-date and comprehensive knowledge on the social sciences.

In war, do mass and materiel matter most? Will states with the largest, best equipped, information-technology-rich militaries invariably win? The prevailing answer today among both scholars and policymakers is yes. But this is to overlook force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is actually used. In a landmark reconception of battle and war, this book provides a systematic account of how force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weaponry. Technological change produces opposite effects depending on how forces are employed; to focus only on materiel is thus to risk major error--with serious consequences for both policy and scholarship. In clear, fluent prose, Biddle provides a systematic account of force employment's role and shows how this account holds up under rigorous, multimethod testing. The results challenge a wide variety of standard views, from current expectations for a revolution in military affairs to mainstream scholarship in international relations and orthodox interpretations of modern military history. Military Power will have a resounding impact on both scholarship in the field and on policy debates over the future of warfare, the size of the military, and the makeup of the defense budget.

Why do some militaries support and others thwart transitions to democracy? After the Arab Spring revolutions, why did Egypt's military stage a coup to end the transition? Conversely, why did Tunisia's military initially support the transition, only to later facilitate the elected president's dismantling of democracy? In Soldiers of Democracy? Military Legacies and the Arab Spring, Sharan Grewal argues that a military's behavior under democracy is shaped by how it had been treated under autocracy. Autocrats who had empowered their militaries produce soldiers who will repress protests and stage coups to preserve their privileges. Meanwhile, autocrats who had marginalized their militaries produce soldiers who support democratization, but who are also more susceptible to incumbent takeovers and civil wars. The dictator's choice to either empower or marginalize the military thus creates legacies that shape both the likelihood of democratization and the forms by which it breaks down. Drawing on over 140 interviews with civilian and military leaders, and three surveys of military personnel, this scholarly volume illustrates this theory through detailed case studies of Egypt and Tunisia. Grewal also probes the generalizability of the theory through a cross-national analysis of all countries between 1946-2010. Overall, he brings the military front and center to the study of democratic transition and consolidation.

This book introduces the politics of the modern Middle East, which includes the countries of the Persian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean countries, and North Africa. It covers the major geographical regions that make up the Middle East, and summarizes the post-World War I history of the Middle East.

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.