Darwinian evolution is taught unreservedly to students of science around the world as incontrovertible truth even though many aspects of the theory have been thoroughly discredited while others are woefully lacking in corroboration from a standpoint of proper scientific precept and practice. Practical and honest scientists increasingly are acknowledging that evolutionism is biologically and mathematically impossible. The outlandish premise is at odds with the laws of physics and manifestly incompatible with genuine geological and paleontological criteria for aging and classifying rocks, strata and fossils. Evolutionary theory's ostracism of God as a supreme designer and creator of the universe and of life has emboldened many of history's most ruthless dictators who have embraced its disturbing message to commit crimes of unspeakable evil. Many millions of people have lost their lives as demagogues, fueled by evolutionist inclinations, have sought to legitimize sinister proclivities such as racism, bigotry, eugenics and ethnic cleansing, among other perpetrations of antipathy and wickedness. It is not unreasonable to assume that many of today's social and behavioral thinkers, as well as misguided scientists who support evolutionary theory, also nurture predilections that are far removed from wholesome deportment and espouse leanings that show scant respect for the sanctity of human life. Evolutionary thought falls outside the precincts of essential moral contemplation.and is beyond the realm of real science!

First published in 1987, Professor O'Sullivan's work provides an in depth philosophical examination of the foundations of method in Economics and other human sciences. The argument is unabashedly dialectical in the great Socratic-Platonic tradition, and the reissue will be very welcome to all students of methodology, in particular those students of economic methodology seeking a refreshing alternative to yet more mathematical game playing. In an age dominated and perhaps to an extent perplexed by an ultimately non-committal postmodernism the book provides a root and branch critique of the epistemological relativism which must lie at the root of the whole post-modernist approach; and in reasserting the fundamental importance not only for the methods of science but also for European civilisation of the pursuit of truth it takes a stance which is very much against the tide of the times. A heterodox perspective is also provided and defended in detail regarding the real nature of economic methodology whereby it is shown that Economics epitomises a teleological mode of explanation which is significantly different from the efficient causal modes of explanation of the natural sciences. In fact Economics is the ultimate subjectivist/interpretative discipline in the methodological sense of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz, a fact which has only been recognised (and welcomed) in the Austrian school of Economics.

How do sacraments differ from superstition? For Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, both are merely natural actions claiming a supernatural effect, an accusation that has long been ignored in Catholic theology. In Maurice Blondel on the Supernatural in Human Action: Sacrament and Superstition, however, Cathal Doherty SJ reverses this accusation through a theological appropriation of Blondel's philosophy of action, arguing not only that sacraments have no truck with superstition but that the 'Enlightened' are themselves guilty of that which they most abhor, superstitious action. Doherty then uses Blondel's philosophical insights as a heuristic and corrective to putative sacramental theologies that would reduce the spiritual or supernatural efficacy of sacraments to the mere human effort of perception or symbolic interpretation.

This book aims to perform a critical and broad assessment of the historiography of science produced from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century. It presents its main authors, concepts, ideas, conceptions, and schools. It also analyzes the historical circumstances of the rise of the discipline history of science and the relations of the historiography of science with related areas. These chapters do not understand the historiography of science as a mere description or record of the history of science. Instead, they understand the historiography of science from the epistemological criteria and choices that guided the writing of the history of science in its different contexts. In other words, more than describing the record of the various possibilities of historiographical approaches to science, the chapters carry out an epistemological reflection to assess the bases, possibilities, scope, and limits of different historiographical conceptions, authors, and traditions that have established the writing of the history of science. This book can be conceived as a reference work not only for professional historians and philosophers but also for academics from different backgrounds who are initiating themselves in the universe of history and philosophy of science, be they scientists from different fields or young researchers from different backgrounds who want to start studying the history and philosophy of science.

The first systematic study of the aesthetic evaluations that scientists pass on their theories.

This book is a guide for teachers, student teachers, teacher educators, science education researchers and curriculum developers who wish to get to grips with the vast and complex literature encompassing the history of science, philosophy of science and sociology of science (HPS).

"This book tells the story of how a cadre of dedicated, iconoclastic scientists raised the awareness of a long recognized preference for publishing positive, eye catching, but irreproducible results to the status of a genuine scientific crisis. Most famously encapsulated in 2005 by John Ioannidis' iconic title: "Why Most Published Research Findings are False," awareness of the seriousness of the crisis itself was in full bloom sometime around 2011-2012 when a veritable flood of supporting empirical and methodological work began appearing in the scientific literature detailing both the extent of the crisis and how it could be ameliorated. Perhaps most importantly of all, a number of mass replications of large sets of (a) published psychology experiments (100 in all) by the Open Science Collaboration, (b) preclinical cancer experiments (53) which a large pharmaceutical company considered sufficiently promising to pursue if the original results were reproducible, and (c) 67 similarly promising studies upon which an even larger pharmaceutical company decided to replicate prior to initiating the expense and time consuming developmental process. Shockingly, less than 50% of these 220 study results could be replicated, thereby providing unwelcomed evidence that Ioannidis' projections (and others performed later) were not simply pejorative flights of fantasy but possibly underestimates of the actual crisis at hand. Fortunately a plethora of practical, procedural behaviors accompanied these demonstrations which were quite capable of greatly reducing the prevalence of future irreproducible results. Therefore the primary purpose of this book is to provide guidance to practicing and aspiring scientists regarding how (a) to change the way in which science has historically been both conducted and reported in order to avoid producing false positive, irreproducible results in their own work and (b) ultimately to change those institutional practices (primarily but not exclusively involving the traditional journal publishing process and the academic reward system) that have unwittingly contributed to the present crisis. For what is actually needed is nothing less than a change in the scientific culture itself. A culture which will prioritize conducting research correctly in order to get things right rather than simply getting published. Hopefully this book can make a small contribution to that end"--

Objectivity has a history, and it is full of surprises. In Objectivity, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison chart the emergence of objectivity in the mid-nineteenth-century sciences — and show how the concept differs from alternatives, truth-to-nature and trained judgment. This is a story of lofty epistemic ideals fused with workaday practices in the making of scientific images. From the eighteenth through the early twenty-first centuries, the images that reveal the deepest commitments of the empirical sciences — from anatomy to crystallography — are those featured in scientific atlases: the compendia that teach practitioners of a discipline what is worth looking at and how to look at it. Atlas images define the working objects of the sciences of the eye: snowflakes, galaxies, skeletons, even elementary particles. Galison and Daston use atlas images to uncover a hidden history of scientific objectivity and its rivals. Whether an atlas maker idealizes an image to capture the essentials in the name of truth-to-nature or refuses to erase even the most incidental detail in the name of objectivity or highlights patterns in the name of trained judgment is a decision enforced by an ethos as well as by an epistemology. As Daston and Galison argue, atlases shape the subjects as well as the objects of science. To pursue objectivity — or truth-to-nature or trained judgment — is simultaneously to cultivate a distinctive scientific self wherein knowing and knower converge. Moreover, the very point at which they visibly converge is in the very act of seeing not as a separate individual but as a member of a particular scientific community. Embedded in the atlas image, therefore, are the traces of consequential choices about knowledge, persona, and collective sight. Objectivity is a book addressed to any one interested in the elusive and crucial notion of objectivity — and in what it means to peer into the world scientifically.