Much of our thinking is flawed because it is based on faulty intuition. By using the framework and tools of probability and statistics, we can overcome this to provide solutions to many real-world problems and paradoxes. We show how to do this, and find answers that are frequently very contrary to what we might expect. Along the way, we venture into diverse realms and thought experiments which challenge the way that we see the world. Features: An insightful and engaging discussion of some of the key ideas of probabilistic and statistical thinking Many classic and novel problems, paradoxes, and puzzles An exploration of some of the big questions involving the use of choice and reason in an uncertain world The application of probability, statistics, and Bayesian methods to a wide range of subjects, including economics, finance, law, and medicine Exercises, references, and links for those wishing to cross-reference or to probe further Solutions to exercises at the end of the book This book should serve as an invaluable and fascinating resource for university, college, and high school students who wish to extend their reading, as well as for teachers and lecturers who want to liven up their courses while retaining academic rigour. It will also appeal to anyone who wishes to develop skills with numbers or has an interest in the many statistical and other paradoxes that permeate our lives. Indeed, anyone studying the sciences, social sciences, or humanities on a formal or informal basis will enjoy and benefit from this book.

Decision theory and the theory of rational choice have recently been the subjects of considerable research by philosophers and economists. However, no adequate anthology exists which can be used to introduce students to the field. This volume is designed to meet that need. The essays included are organized into five parts covering the foundations of decision theory, the conceptualization of probability and utility, pholosophical difficulties with the rules of rationality and with the assessment of probability, and causal decision theory. The editors provide an extensive introduction to the field and introductions to each part.

The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science Foundation and the School of Humanities of the University of California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California at Irvine Vll INTRODUCTION PART I: DECISIONS AND GAMES Causal notions have recently corne to figure prominently in discussions about rational decision making. Indeed, a relatively influential new approach to theorizing about rational choice has come to be called "causal decision theory". 1 Decision problems such as Newcombe's Problem and some versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma where an act counts as evidence for a desired state even though the agent knows his choice of that act cannot causally influence whether or not the state obtains have motivated causal decision theorists.

This book discusses the two fundamental elements that underline the science and design of artificial intelligence (AI) systems: the learning and acquisition of knowledge from observational data, and the reasoning of that knowledge together with whatever information is available about the application at hand. It then presents a mathematical treatment of the core issues that arise when unifying first-order logic and probability, especially in the presence of dynamics, including physical actions, sensing actions and their effects. A model for expressing causal laws describing dynamics is also considered, along with computational ideas for reasoning with such laws over probabilistic logical knowledge.

"This text covers the development of decision theory and related applications of probability. Extensive examples and illustrations cultivate students' appreciation for applications, including strength of materials, soil mechanics, construction planning, and water-resource design. Emphasis on fundamentals makes the material accessible to students trained in classical statistics and provides a brief introduction to probability. 1970 edition"--

Within traditional decision theory, common decision principles -- e.g. the principle to maximize utility -- generally invoke idealization; they govern ideal agents in ideal circumstances. In Realistic Decision Theory, Paul Weirch adds practicality to decision theory by formulating principles applying to nonideal agents in nonideal circumstances, such as real people coping with complex decisions. Bridging the gap between normative demands and psychological resources, Realistic Decision Theory is essential reading for theorists seeking precise normative decision principles that acknowledge the limits and difficulties of human decision-making.

Paradoxes provide a vehicle for exposing misinterpretations and misapplications of accepted principles. This book discusses seven paradoxes surrounding probability theory. Some remain the focus of controversy; others have allegedly been solved, however the accepted solutions are demonstrably incorrect. Each paradox is shown to rest on one or more fallacies. Instead of the esoteric, idiosyncratic, and untested methods that have been brought to bear on these problems, the book invokes uncontroversial probability principles, acceptable both to frequentists and subjectivists. The philosophical disputation inspired by these paradoxes is shown to be misguided and unnecessary; for instance, startling claims concerning human destiny and the nature of reality are directly related to fallacious reasoning in a betting paradox, and a problem analyzed in philosophy journals is resolved by means of a computer program.​

At least since plato and Aristotle, thinkers have pondered the relationship between philosophical arguments and the "sophistical" arguments offered by the Sophists -- who were the first professional lawyers. Judges wield substantial political power, and the justifications they offer for their decisions are a vital means by which citizens can assess the legitimacy of how that power is exercised. However, to evaluate judicial justifications requires close attention to the method of reasoning behind decisions. This new collection illuminates and explains the political and moral importance in justifying the exercise of judicial power.

This volume collects the extended abstracts of 45 contributions of participants to the Seventh International Summer School on Aggregation Operators (AGOP 2013), held at Pamplona in July, 16-20, 2013. These contributions cover a very broad range, from the purely theoretical ones to those with a more applied focus. Moreover, the summaries of the plenary talks and tutorials given at the same workshop are included. Together they provide a good overview of recent trends in research in aggregation functions which can be of interest to both researchers in Physics or Mathematics working on the theoretical basis of aggregation functions, and to engineers who require them for applications.

We confess that the first part of our title is somewhat of a misnomer. Bayesian reasoning is a normative approach to probabilistic belief revision and, as such, it is in need of no improvement. Rather, it is the typical individual whose reasoning and judgments often fall short of the Bayesian ideal who is the focus of improvement. What have we learnt from over a half-century of research and theory on this topic that could explain why people are often non-Bayesian? Can Bayesian reasoning be facilitated, and if so why? These are the questions that motivate this Frontiers in Psychology Research Topic. Bayes' theorem, named after English statistician, philosopher, and Presbyterian minister, Thomas Bayes, offers a method for updating one’s prior probability of an hypothesis H on the basis of new data D such that P(H|D) = P(D|H)P(H)/P(D). The first wave of psychological research, pioneered by Ward Edwards, revealed that people were overly conservative in updating their posterior probabilities (i.e., P(D|H)). A second wave, spearheaded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, showed that people often ignored prior probabilities or base rates, where the priors had a frequentist interpretation, and hence were not Bayesians at all. In the 1990s, a third wave of research spurred by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby and by Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage showed that people can reason more like a Bayesian if only the information provided takes the form of (non-relativized) natural frequencies. Although Kahneman and Tversky had already noted the advantages of frequency representations, it was the third wave scholars who pushed the prescriptive agenda, arguing that there are feasible and effective methods for improving belief revision. Most scholars now agree that natural frequency representations do facilitate Bayesian reasoning. However, they do not agree on why this is so. The original third wave scholars favor an evolutionary account that posits human brain adaptation to natural frequency processing. But almost as soon as this view was proposed, other scholars challenged it, arguing that such evolutionary assumptions were not needed. The dominant opposing view has been that the benefit of natural frequencies is mainly due to the fact that such representations make the nested set relations perfectly transparent. Thus, people can more easily see what information they need to focus on and how to simply combine it. This Research Topic aims to take stock of where we are at present. Are we in a proto-fourth wave? If so, does it offer a synthesis of recent theoretical disagreements? The second part of the title orients the reader to the two main subtopics: what works and why? In terms of the first subtopic, we seek contributions that advance understanding of how to improve people’s abilities to revise their beliefs and to integrate probabilistic information effectively. The second subtopic centers on explaining why methods that improve non-Bayesian reasoning work as well as they do. In addressing that issue, we welcome both critical analyses of existing theories as well as fresh perspectives. For both subtopics, we welcome the full range of manuscript types.