The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence presents its report on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq, which contains numerous documents from various U.S. intelligence agencies regarding possible weapons of mass destruction, and other issues relating to Iraq.

The role of intelligence in US government operations has changed dramatically and is now more critical than ever to domestic security and foreign policy. This authoritative and highly researched book written by Jeffrey T. Richelson provides a detailed overview of America's vast intelligence empire, from its organizations and operations to its management structure. Drawing from a multitude of sources, including hundreds of official documents, The US Intelligence Community allows students to understand the full scope of intelligence organizations and activities, and gives valuable support to policymakers and military operations. The seventh edition has been fully revised to include a new chapter on the major issues confronting the intelligence community, including secrecy and leaks, domestic spying, and congressional oversight, as well as revamped chapters on signals intelligence and cyber collection, geospatial intelligence, and open sources. The inclusion of more maps, tables and photos, as well as electronic briefing books on the book's Web site, makes The US Intelligence Community an even more valuable and engaging resource for students.

An look at what Intelligence Community analysts do and how, and how they are affected by the political context that shapes, uses and abuses their outputs. The US government spends billions of dollars every year to reduce uncertainty: to monitor and forecast everything from the weather to the spread of disease. In other words, we spend a lot of money to anticipate problems, identify opportunities, and avoid mistakes. A substantial portion of what we spend—over $50 billion a year—goes to the US Intelligence Community. Reducing Uncertainty describes what Intelligence Community analysts do, how they do it, and how they are affected by the political context that shapes, uses, and sometimes abuses their output. In particular, it looks at why IC analysts pay more attention to threats than to opportunities, and why they appear to focus more on warning about the possibility of “bad things” happening than on providing the input necessary for increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes. The book is intended to increase public understanding of what IC analysts do, to elicit more relevant and constructive suggestions for improvement from outside the Intelligence Community, to stimulate innovation and collaboration among analysts at all grade levels in all agencies, and to provide a core resource for students of intelligence. The most valuable aspect of this book is the in-depth discussion of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)—what they are, what it means to say that they represent the “most authoritative judgments of the Intelligence Community,” why and how they are important, and why they have such high political salience and symbolic importance. The final chapter lays out, from an insider’s perspective, the story of the flawed Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) NIE and its impact on the subsequent Iran nuclear NIE—paying particular attention to the heightened political scrutiny the latter received in Congress following the Iraq NIE debacle. Praise for Reducing Uncertainty “This is a well-documented, well-written piece by a former high-ranking member of the intelligence community . . . . Recommended.” —CHOICE “Fingar provides a clear and useful tour of how intelligence analysis is produced.” —Political Science Quarterly “Tom Fingar provides a frank, detailed examination of the challenges to and successes of the U.S. Intelligence Community. In doing so, he reveals insights and strategies that directly address our national security needs. High-stakes examples described by Fingar provide an insider-account only he can provide. The result is riveting and informative.” —William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense for the United States, 1994 to 1997

The Committee¿s work was shaped by events that occurred in late 2006 and early 2007. Contents: (1) Legislation: FISA Amend. Act of '08; Intell. Author. Bills for '07, '08, and '09; Implementing Recommend. of the 9/11 Comm. Act of '07; Nat. Def. Author. Act for FY '08; Insp. Gen. Reform Act of '08; Law of the Sea Convention; Amend. of Senate Resolution 400; (2) Oversight Activities: Hearings and Briefings; Study Groups; Comm. Inquiries and Reviews; Financial Accounting, Insp. Gen., and Audits; (3) Nominations: J. Michael McConnell, Dir. of Nat. Intell.; John Rizzo, Gen. Counsel, CIA; Donald Kerr, Prin. Dep. Dir. of Nat. Intell.; Michael Leiter, Dir. of the Nat. Counterterr. Center; Patrick Rowan, Assist. AG of Nat. Security, Dept. of Justice.

S. Rept. 108-301. Unclassified edition. Together With Additional Views. Provides the Senate and the American public with a substantial record of the facts underlying the conclusions of the Committee regarding the intelligence community's prewar assessments of Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction and its ties to terrorism. Some text is blacked out. 108th Congress, 2d Session. Jacket 94-712 PDF.

John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning—the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action—is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.

In From Mandate to Blueprint, Thomas Fingar offers a guide for new federal government appointees faced with the complex task of rebuilding institutions and transitioning to a new administration. Synthesizing his own experience implementing the most comprehensive reforms to the national security establishment since 1947, Fingar provides crucial guidance to newly appointed officials. When Fingar was appointed the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis in 2005, he discovered the challenges of establishing a new federal agency and implementing sweeping reforms of intelligence procedure and performance. The mandate required prompt action but provided no guidance on how to achieve required and desirable changes. Fingar describes how he defined and prioritized the tasks involved in building and staffing a new organization, integrating and improving the work of sixteen agencies, and contending with pressure from powerful players. For appointees without the luxury of taking command of fully staffed and well-functioning federal agencies, From Mandate to Blueprint is an informed and practical guide for the challenges ahead.