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The 2000-02 comprehensive review of the Fund’s conditionality culminated in the adoption of a set of conditionality guidelines by the Executive Board on September 25, 2002. The 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (the “guidelines”) replace the 1979 Conditionality Guidelines and the Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality of September 18, 2000. A review of experience with the guidelines, looking at how they have been implemented and at their impact, is conducted periodically; summary statistics on conditionality have been prepared annually since 2008.

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This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.

Adoption of new guidelines for conditionality has been motivated by an increasing recognition of the importance of several interrelated principles for successful design and implementation of Fund-supported programs. Chief among these are national ownership of reform programs, parsimony in the application of program-related conditions, tailoring of programs to the member’s circumstances, effective coordination with other multilateral institutions, and clarity in the specification of conditions. The operational issues covered in the note are grouped into three areas: (i) the process of negotiation and program design; (ii) the design of conditionality; and (iii) the presentation of conditionality in Board papers for the use of Fund resources. In some cases, implementing the guidelines involves the development of new practices. In other cases, new practices had already been adopted in selected cases, which should become routine.

This paper focuses on the fact that the 2004–2005 conditionality review expands to include a review of the application of the new Guidelines on Conditionality, adopted in 2002. These guidelines were the culmination of a comprehensive and far-reaching review of conditionality that aimed to enhance the effectiveness of IMF-supported programs. They represented the first revision of the IMF’s conditionality guidelines since 1979, and were developed by the IMF after seeking input from civil society and public forums held in several countries. This review comes at an early stage of experience with the new guidelines, and further evidence will be needed before definite conclusions can be drawn. The ultimate test of conditionality is whether it contributes to better economic outcomes, including over the medium term, and these cannot yet be gauged. Moreover, although this review draws in part on case studies, no substitute exists for cross-country analysis for identifying broad trends, and at this stage such analysis is hampered by small sample sizes.

The Fund provides considerable support to low-income countries (LICs). This includes concessional financing from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), which currently carries an interest rate of zero percent. Since 2010, over half of Fund-supported arrangements have involved a PRGT facility. Support for poverty reduction is a core objective of arrangements supported by these facilities. This paper examines how PRGT-supported programs safeguard spending on poor and vulnerable groups within the broader framework of promoting inclusive growth. In some cases, national poverty reduction programs seek to shift expenditures toward social programs in the context of generally higher spending supported by domestic revenue mobilization, grants, or debt financing. In other cases, the goal is to safeguard poor and vulnerable groups from fiscal adjustment and reform measures that could adversely affect them by adopting countervailing policy measures to strengthen social safety nets. In discussing social safeguards, this paper focuses on how and if these objectives are reflected satisfactorily in the design of PRGT and PSI-supported programs. The effectiveness of social spending in improving social outcomes, including by durably reducing poverty, is beyond the scope of the paper.

The Fund’s concessional facilities are aimed at providing flexible and tailored support to low-income countries (LICs) in their efforts to achieve, maintain, or restore a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a pivotal institution in global economic governance tasked with ensuring monetary stability and preventing financial crises through promoting balanced trade, economic growth, and poverty reduction. It also plays a powerful normative role by shaping economic policies worldwide through its research and expertise. The IMF played a crucial role in managing crises like the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, providing significant financial aid and advocating for stimulus measures. However, the IMF faces both internal and external challenges from reforming its governance structure to better represent emerging economies to finding its place in a world increasingly defying liberal internationalism and multilateralism. Despite reforms, power remains concentrated among advanced economies, hindering inclusivity and trust, particularly in regions like sub-Saharan Africa. Geopolitical tensions, populist nationalism, and economic imbalances further strain the IMF's effectiveness. This handbook aims to uncover these challenges by providing diverse perspectives and proposing policy recommendations that the Fund could undertake to better navigate the complex landscape of 21st-century global governance. Part I delves into its historical origins and key debates of the IMF. Part II focuses on formal operations such as lending, surveillance, and capacity development. Part III explores the involvement of different actors including states, markets, and civil society. Part IV discusses partnerships with other international organizations and collaboration in financial regulation. Part V analyzes shifts in policy instruments and ideological frameworks. Part VI broadens concerns to include gender mainstreaming, labor markets, climate policy, and inclusive growth. Part VII addresses internal challenges including cultural diversity concerns and uniformity of treatment. Part VIII evaluates external challenges such as populist movements, China's influence, global inequality and unresolved issues in Europe. Part IX explores how the IMF can meet the multiple challenges identified in this volume and positively impact 21st century global governance.

This book is both breathtaking in its scope and impressive in its attention to legal and institutional detail in situating developing countries in the evolving body of international economic law. Essays in this volume canvas most important areas of international economic law, including international trade law, international financial regulation, the regulation of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations, foreign aid, the enforcement of human rights standards and core international labour standards on multinational corporations, international enforcement of anti-corruption conventions, international competition law, international intellectual property rights, and international environmental law. A pervasive theme, compellingly developed, in most of these papers is the asymmetric structure of international institutions that generate rules in these various areas, in which developing countries are mostly rule takers, rather than equal participants. The current global financial crisis may provide a welcome opportunity for re-evaluating these institutional asymmetries. In any such re-evaluation, this book will provide a veritable cornucopia of constructive new insights.