Adoption of new guidelines for conditionality has been motivated by an increasing recognition of the importance of several interrelated principles for successful design and implementation of Fund-supported programs. Chief among these are national ownership of reform programs, parsimony in the application of program-related conditions, tailoring of programs to the member’s circumstances, effective coordination with other multilateral institutions, and clarity in the specification of conditions. The operational issues covered in the note are grouped into three areas: (i) the process of negotiation and program design; (ii) the design of conditionality; and (iii) the presentation of conditionality in Board papers for the use of Fund resources. In some cases, implementing the guidelines involves the development of new practices. In other cases, new practices had already been adopted in selected cases, which should become routine.

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The 2000-02 comprehensive review of the Fund’s conditionality culminated in the adoption of a set of conditionality guidelines by the Executive Board on September 25, 2002. The 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (the “guidelines”) replace the 1979 Conditionality Guidelines and the Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality of September 18, 2000. A review of experience with the guidelines, looking at how they have been implemented and at their impact, is conducted periodically; summary statistics on conditionality have been prepared annually since 2008.

This paper focuses on the fact that the 2004–2005 conditionality review expands to include a review of the application of the new Guidelines on Conditionality, adopted in 2002. These guidelines were the culmination of a comprehensive and far-reaching review of conditionality that aimed to enhance the effectiveness of IMF-supported programs. They represented the first revision of the IMF’s conditionality guidelines since 1979, and were developed by the IMF after seeking input from civil society and public forums held in several countries. This review comes at an early stage of experience with the new guidelines, and further evidence will be needed before definite conclusions can be drawn. The ultimate test of conditionality is whether it contributes to better economic outcomes, including over the medium term, and these cannot yet be gauged. Moreover, although this review draws in part on case studies, no substitute exists for cross-country analysis for identifying broad trends, and at this stage such analysis is hampered by small sample sizes.

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This paper reviews the design of conditionality in Fund-supported programs from 2002 to end-September 2011, with an emphasis on recent years. It focuses on the content and application of program conditionality—especially structural conditionality—in relation to the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), the Staff Statement on Principles Underlying the Guidelines on Conditionality, and subsequent revisions to operational guidance on conditionality. The analysis is based on the five key interrelated principles guiding the design of conditionality: national ownership of programs, parsimony in program-related conditions, tailoring to country circumstances, effective coordination with other multilateral institutions, and clarity in the specification of conditions. In particular, the principle of parsimony requires that program-related conditions be critical (or the minimum necessary) to achieve program objectives and goals, critical for monitoring program implementation, or necessary for implementing specific provisions under the Articles of Agreement (the "criticality criterion"). Beyond assessing compliance with these guidelines and principles, the paper also examines the implementation of conditionality

This note aims to provide guidance on the key principles and considerations underlying the design of Fund-supported programs. The note expands on the previous operational guidance notes on conditionality published over 2003-2014, incorporating lessons from the 2018-19 Review of Conditionality, and other recent key policy developments including the recommendation of the Management’s Implementation Plan in response to Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)’s report on growth and adjustment in IMF-supported programs. The note in particular highlights operational advice to (i) improve the realism of macroeconomic forecast in programs and fostering a more systematic analysis of contingency plans and risks; (ii) improve the focus, depth, implementation, and tailoring of structural conditions (SCs), with due consideration of growth effects; and (iii) help strengthen the ownership of country authorities. Designed as a comprehensive reference and primer on program design and conditionality in an accessible and transparent manner, the note refers in summary to a broad range of economic and policy considerations over the lifecycle of Fund-supported programs. As with all guidance notes, the relevant IMF Executive Board Decisions remain the primary legal authority on matters covered in this note.

This note provides general guidance on the operationalization of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) for arrangement requests and reviews. The RSF complements the existing IMF lending toolkit by providing longer-term, affordable financing to members to help them address longer-term structural challenges from climate change and pandemic preparedness. The note has benefited from experience gained during early operationalization of the RSF.

The Fund regularly assesses conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with the next formal review planned for 2011. This paper summarizes previous assessments of conditionality, outlines staff’s proposed approach to the forthcoming review, and seeks Directors’ early views on the approach.

The Fund’s concessional facilities are aimed at providing flexible and tailored support to low-income countries (LICs) in their efforts to achieve, maintain, or restore a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth.