This volume studies the links among the concepts of globalization, security, and the authority of the nation state, drawing attention to why and how these three concepts are interrelated and why they should be studied together. Contributors explore the connections between security and global transformations, and the corresponding or resulting changes in state structures that emerge. Probing and extending existing paradigms, the book offers three regional cases studies: the periphery states of the Middle East and North Africa, the second world states of the Russian Federation, and the core states of the European Union. It concludes with three chapters that synthesize the above themes to identify corresponding changes in the patterns of international politics.

First Published in 1992. This volume includes Raskin's political essays on true democracy in running a nation's security affairs. He explores the arrogance of power, offers a commitment to constructive critique of government policy and alternative proposals to resolve problems of a nation trying to live up to the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

Beatrice Edwards, executive director of the organization representing Edward Snowden and four other NSA whistleblowers, argues that we now live in a Corporate Security State, where the government is more interested in protecting the companies that serve it than the citizens who support it. Hheavy domestic surveillance, political persecution of dissenters, the threat of indefinite detention codified into law—how did we get here? And is there a way out? Edwards details how intelligence agencies took advantage of 9/11 to illegitimately extend the government's reach. Corporations, she shows, were only too eager to sell them expensive surveillance technology, as well as share data on customers and employees using the bogus threat of an imminent “cyber war.” This is why the Justice Department isn't going after the institutions responsible for the financial collapse of 2008—government and business are partners in crime. But Edwards offers a plan to fight back and restore transparency to government, keep private information private, and make democracy a reality once again.

Is the State Department doing enough to keep U.S. personnel safe? U.S. personnel overseas can be targets of terrorism, violence, and crime—particularly while in transit. From 1998 to 2015, State Department personnel were attacked more than 100 times while traveling outside of embassy compounds, with many of the worst attacks occurring while victims were in motorcades, official vehicles, or other forms of transportation. The Department of State has taken steps to protect personnel in transit, but we found opportunities to enhance transportation policies, training, and communications, and made multiple recommendations to that end. What GAO Found The Department of State (State) has established policies related to transportation security for overseas U.S. personnel, but gaps exist in guidance and monitoring. GAO reviewed 26 posts and found that all 26 had issued transportation security and travel notification policies. However, policies at 22 of the 26 posts lacked elements required by State, due in part to fragmented implementation guidance on what such policies should include. State also lacks a clear armored vehicle policy for overseas posts and procedures for monitoring if posts are assessing their armored vehicle needs at least annually as required by State. These gaps limit State's ability to ensure that posts develop clear policies that are consistent with State's requirements and that vehicle needs for secure transit are met. While State provides several types of training related to overseas transportation security, weaknesses exist in post-specific refresher training. Regional security officers (RSO) receive required training related to transportation security in special agent courses, and nonsecurity staff reported receiving relevant training before departing for posts—including on topics such as defensive driving and the importance of taking personal responsibility for one's security—as well as new arrival briefings at posts. At most of the 9 posts GAO visited, however, staff had difficulty remembering key details covered in new arrival briefings or described the one-time briefings as inadequate. State's requirements for providing refresher briefings are unclear, potentially putting staff at greater risk. State uses various systems at overseas posts to communicate time-sensitive information related to transportation security, but several factors hinder its efforts. RSOs and other post officials are responsible for communicating threat information to post personnel. However, at 4 of the 9 posts it visited, GAO learned of instances in which staff did not receive important threat information in a timely manner for various reasons. In one case, this resulted in an embassy vehicle being attacked with rocks and seriously damaged while traveling through a prohibited area. In addition, while all 9 of the posts GAO visited require that personnel notify the RSO before traveling to certain locations, personnel at more than half of the 9 posts said they were unaware of these requirements or had difficulty accessing required travel notification systems. Timely communication is critical for managing transportation security risks, and failure to communicate important transportation-related information and receive such information promptly could leave overseas personnel facing avoidable security risks. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. diplomatic personnel posted overseas continue to face threats to their security. According to State, personnel and their families are particularly vulnerable when traveling outside the relative security of diplomatic work facilities or residences. In many serious or fatal attacks on U.S. personnel over the last three decades, victims were targeted while in motorcades, official vehicles, or otherwise in transit. GAO was asked to review how State manages transportation-related security risks to U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which State, with regard to transportation security at overseas posts, has (1) established policies, guidance, and monitoring; (2) provided personnel with training; and (3) communicated time-sensitive information. GAO reviewed agency documents and met with key officials in Washington, D.C. GAO also reviewed policies from a judgmental sample of 26 posts—primarily higher-threat, higher-risk locations—and conducted fieldwork and met with officials at 9 of these posts. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in September 2016. What GAO Recommends GAO is making eight recommendations in this report to help State improve its management of transportation-related security risks by enhancing associated policies, guidance, and monitoring; clarifying its requirements for refresher briefings; and better communicating time-sensitive information. State agreed to take steps for all but one recommendation—the need to clarify its requirements for refresher briefings. GAO continues to believe this is needed as discussed in the report.

Investigates security clearance given William Wieland, his meetings with Fidel Castro and activities as a State Dept official both before and after Castro's takeover of Cuba. Also considers questionable State Dept security practices.

Sir David Omand served as Intelligence and Security Coordinator in the Cabinet Office from 2002-2005, coordinating counterterrorism strategy. He draws on historical examples to argue for a new outlook on the relationship between security and intelligence--one that respects human rights and avoids the pitfalls of flawed information.

Special edition of the Federal Register, containing a codification of documents of general applicability and future effect ... with ancillaries.

Do existing measures of state fragility measure fragility accurately? Based on commonly used fragility measures, South Africa (SA) is classified as a relatively stable state, yet rising violent crime, high unemployment, endemic poverty, eroding public trust, identity group based preferential treatment policies, and the rapid rise of the private security sector are all indications that SA may be suffering from latent state fragility. Based on a comprehensive view of security, this study examines the extent to which measures of political legitimacy and good governance, effectiveness in the security system – especially with respect to the police system – and mounting economic challenges may be undermining the stability of SA in ways undetected by commonly used measures of state fragility. Using a mixed-methods approach based on quantitative secondary data analysis and semi-structured interviews with government officials, security practitioners, and leading experts in the field, this study finds that the combination of colonization, apartheid, liberation struggle, transition from autocracy to democracy, high levels of direct and structural violence, stagnating social, political, and economic developments make South Africa a latently fragile state. Conceptually, the results of this research call into question the validity of commonly used measures of state fragility and suggest the need for a more comprehensive approach to assessing state fragility. Practically, this study offers a number of concrete policy recommendations for how South Africa may address mounting levels of latent state fragility.

Identifies and describes specific government assistance opportunities such as loans, grants, counseling, and procurement contracts available under many agencies and programs.