Deterring terrorism is best approached as part of a broad effort to influence all elements of a terrorist system, and simple, conceptual models of decisionmaking can help in understanding how to affect others' behavior. The paper lays out a theory of how to use influence to affect elements of a terrorist system, touching on root causes, individual motivation, public support, and likely factors in the decisionmaking of terrorist organizations.

Since the early 1960s, the U.S. strategic nuclear posture has been composed of a triad of nuclear-certified long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Since the early 1970s, U.S. nuclear forces have been subject to strategic arms control agreements. The large numbers and diversified nature of the U.S. nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear forces, which cannot be ignored as part of the overall nuclear deterrent, have decreased substantially since the Cold War. While there is domestic consensus today on the need to maintain an effective deterrent, there is no consensus on precisely what that requires, especially in a changing geopolitical environment and with continued reductions in nuclear arms. This places a premium on having the best possible analytic tools, methods, and approaches for understanding how nuclear deterrence and assurance work, how they might fail, and how failure can be averted by U.S. nuclear forces. U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities identifies the broad analytic issues and factors that must be considered in seeking nuclear deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies in the 21st century. This report describes and assesses tools, methods - including behavioral science-based methods - and approaches for improving the understanding of how nuclear deterrence and assurance work or may fail in the 21st century and the extent to which such failures might be averted or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces. The report recommends criteria and a framework for validating the tools, methods, and approaches and for identifying those most promising for Air Force usage.

During the Cold War, deterrence theory was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, popular wisdom dictated that terrorist organizations and radical fanatics could not be deterred—and governments shifted their attention to combating terrorism rather than deterring it. This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when and where terrorism can be deterred. It first identifies how and where theories of deterrence apply to counterterrorism, highlighting how traditional and less-traditional notions of deterrence can be applied to evolving terrorist threats. It then applies these theoretical propositions to real-world threats to establish the role deterrence has within a dynamic counterterrorism strategy—and to identify how metrics can be created for measuring the success of terrorism deterrence strategies. In sum, it provides a foundation for developing effective counterterrorism policies to help states contain or curtail the terrorism challenges they face.

Inside the Pentagon's secretive and revolutionary new strategy to fight terrorism--and its game-changing effects in the Middle East and at home In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States waged a "war on terror" that sought to defeat Al Qaeda through brute force. But it soon became clear that this strategy was not working, and by 2005 the Pentagon began looking for a new way. In Counterstrike, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker of The New York Times tell the story of how a group of analysts within the military, at spy agencies, and in law enforcement has fashioned an innovative and effective new strategy to fight terrorism, unbeknownst to most Americans and in sharp contrast to the cowboy slogans that characterized the U.S. government's public posture. Adapting themes from classic Cold War deterrence theory, these strategists have expanded the field of battle in order to disrupt jihadist networks in ever more creative ways. Schmitt and Shanker take readers deep into this theater of war, as ground troops, intelligence operatives, and top executive branch officials have worked together to redefine and restrict the geography available for Al Qaeda to operate in. They also show how these new counterterrorism strategies, adopted under George W. Bush and expanded under Barack Obama, were successfully employed in planning and carrying out the dramatic May 2011 raid in which Osama bin Laden was killed. Filled with startling revelations about how our national security is being managed, Counterstrike will change the way Americans think about the ongoing struggle with violent radical extremism.

With a foreword by Major-General Nico Geerts, Commander Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands International conflict resolution increasingly involves the use of non-military power and non-kinetic capabilities alongside military capabilities in the face of hybrid threats. In this book, counter-measures to those threats are addressed by academics with both practical and theoretical experience and knowledge, providing strategic and operational insights into non-kinetic conflict resolution and on the use of power to influence, affect, deter or coerce states and non-state actors. This volume in the NL ARMS series deals with the non-kinetic capabilities to address international crises and conflicts and as always views matters from a global perspective. Included are chapters on the promise, practice and challenges of non-kinetic instruments of power, the instrumentality of soft power, information as a power instrument and manoeuvring in the information environment, Russia's use of deception and misinformation in conflict, applying counter-marketing techniques to fight ISIL, using statistics to profile terrorists, and employing tools such as Actor and Audience Analysis. Such diverse subjects as lawfare, the Law of Armed Conflict rules for non-kinetic cyber attacks, navigation warfare, GPS-spoofing, maritime interception operations, and finally, as a prerequisite, innovative ways for intelligence collection in UN Peacekeeping in Mali come up for discussion.The book will provide both professionals such as (foreign) policy makers and those active in the military services, academics at a master level and those with an interest in military law and the law of armed conflict with useful and up-to-date insights into the wide range of subjects that are contained within it. Paul A.L. Ducheine and Frans P.B. Osinga are General Officers and full professors at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda, The Netherlands. Specific to this volume in the Series: • Written by academics with both practical and theoretical experience• Addresses counter measures to hybrid crises• Offers both strategic and operational insights to non-kinetic conflict resolution

Deterring terrorism is best approached as part of a broad effort to influence all elements of a terrorist system, and simple, conceptual models of decisionmaking can help in understanding how to affect others' behavior. The paper lays out a theory of how to use influence to affect elements of a terrorist system, touching on root causes, individual motivation, public support, and likely factors in the decisionmaking of terrorist organizations.

This report offers research and recommendations on ways to measure the overall efforts of the national border-security enterprise between ports of entry. Focusing on three missions--illegal drug control, counterterrorism, and illegal migration--this report recommends ways to measure performance of U.S. border-security efforts in terms of interdiction, deterrence, and exploiting networked intelligence.