This book investigates drivers and trends in nuclear proliferation in the Global South. Based on an in-depth analysis of South Africa’s nuclear history, it examines general causes of proliferation, such as technical capabilities and constraints; a country’s motivation to build a nuclear bomb; and particular domestic and international situations. It also highlights Britain’s role in the development of technological capability in South Africa and explains how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Finally, the study offers effective solutions to the problem of nuclear proliferation in developing countries.

Contents: Research Problem and Assumptions; South Africa's Nuclear Capability; Utility for South African Nuclear Weapons; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Economic Interests; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Interests in Access to Strategic Materials; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Political Interests; The Effect of South African Proliferation on Western Military Interests; South African Proliferation and Western Security Interests in General. (fr).

South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction offers an in-depth view of the secret development and voluntary disarmament of South Africa's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons program, Project Coast. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess explore how systems used for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in South Africa were acquired and established beyond the gaze of international and domestic political actors. On the basis of archival evidence from Project Coast and their own extensive interviews with military and political officials, Purkitt and Burgess consider what motivates countries to acquire and build such powerful weaponry and examine when and how decisions are made to dismantle a military arsenal voluntarily. Questions such as how to destroy weapons safely and keep them from reappearing on international markets are considered along with comparative strategies for successful disarmament in other nation-states.

This book offers a novel approach to understanding the puzzle of nuclear proliferation by examining how leaders’ beliefs and perceptions about the international system influence states' decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Today, there is a persisting dilemma over the spread of nuclear weapons for both practitioners and scholars of international affairs. Uncertainty remains whether determined proliferators can be stopped, as shown by the cases of North Korea and Iran. These instances of proliferation raise questions about regional stability, the use of pre-emptive military action, and the potential for reactive-proliferation by neighbouring countries. Despite the serious implications surrounding the spread of these weapons, proliferation scholarship has thus far failed to solve what has been described as the "proliferation puzzle"- why do some countries choose nuclear weapons while others do not? The author argues that understanding basic psychological motivations, such as the role of power and perceptions of self and others, forms a strategic context which provides answers about a leader’s willingness to proliferate. Proliferation willingness is a critical, yet frequently overlooked, part of the proliferation equation. Ultimately, it is the combination of willingness and proliferation opportunity (i.e. technical and scientific capabilities) that determines whether a country 'goes nuclear'. By examining several historical instances of proliferation decision-making—in South Africa, India, Libya and Australia—the book's findings highlight the fundamental role of leaders’ beliefs in shaping proliferation outcomes. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, political psychology, security studies and IR in general.

The chapters of this proposed volume are intended to shed light on the diverse themes surrounding this very important issue area in international security. Each of the six major sections addresses an aspect of nuclear proliferation that will be critical in determining the future trajectory of global politics in the years to come. The first section examines the major thematic issues underlying the contemporary discourse on nuclear proliferation. How do we understand this period in proliferation? What accounts for a taboo on the use of nuclear weapons so far and will it survive? What is the present state of nuclear deterrence models built during the Cold War? What is the relationship between the pursuit of civilian nuclear energy and the risks of proliferation? Why are we witnessing a move away from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation? The second section gives an overview of the evolving nuclear policies of the five established nuclear powers: the USA, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China. Section three looks at the three de facto nuclear states: India, Pakistan and Israel. The fourth section examines the three problem areas in the proliferation matrix today – Iran, North Korea and the potent mix of non-state actors and nuclear weapons. The fifth section sheds light on an important issue often ignored during discussions of nuclear proliferation – cases where states have made a deliberate policy choice of either renouncing their nuclear weapons programme, or have decided to remain a threshold state. The cases of South Africa, Egypt and Japan will be the focus of this section. The final section will examine the present state of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, which most observers agree is currently facing a crisis of credibility. The three pillars of this regime – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) – will be examined. This is followed by an analysis of the present trends and prospects for US-Russia nuclear arms control. The impact of missile defenses and the US-India civilian nuclear energy co-operation pact will be examined so as to ascertain whether they have weakened or strengthened the global non-proliferation regime. The chapters in this volume aim to document the increasing complexity of the global nuclear proliferation dynamic and the inability of the international community to come to terms with a rapidly changing strategic milieu. The future, in all likelihood, will be very different from the past, and the chapters in this volume will try to develop a framework that may help gain a better understanding of the forces that will shape the nuclear proliferation debate in the years to come. Proposed Contents Introduction – Overview Part 1: Thematic Issues The Second Nuclear Age The Nuclear Taboo Nuclear Deterrence Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Non-Proliferation and Counter Proliferation Non-State Actors and Nuclear Weapons Part 2: The Five Nuclear Powers USA Russia United Kingdom France People's Republic of China Part 3: De Facto Nuclear States India Pakistan Israel Part 4: The ‘Problem’ States Iran North Korea Part 5: The ‘Threshold’ States South Africa Japan Egypt Part 6: The Global Non-Proliferation Regime The NPT The CTBT The FMCT US-Russia Nuclear Arms Control The Impact of Missile Defenses The US-India Nuclear Deal The Future: What It May Hold In Store Conclusion

Stephen M. Meyer steps back from the emotions and rhetoric surrounding the nuclear arms debates to provide a systematic examination of the underlying determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation. Looking at current theories of nuclear proliferation, he asks: Must a nation that acquires the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons eventually do so? In an analysis, remarkable for its rigor and accessibility, Meyer provides the first empirical, statistical model explaining why particular countries became nuclear powers when they did. His findings clearly contradict the notion that the pace of nuclear proliferation is controlled by a technological imperative and show that political and military factors account for the past decisions of nations to acquire or forgo the development of nuclear weapons.

The primary focus of this paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful developments and subsequent rollbacks of South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the key milestones in the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa's nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from flu's effort are the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own identity Crisis. Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation and receive guarantees of its security rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared total onslaught by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West.

The intensification of the Iranian and North Korean nuclear crises has created new fears that deteriorating security conditions in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and other regions will lead additional countries to seek their own nuclear arsenals in the years to come. This special issue examines the factors that are likely to shape nuclear weapons proliferation over the next decade. The internationally recognized authors of this issue, many of whom are prominent scholars and others of whom have held influential governmental positions with responsibility for countering nuclear proliferation, bring to light the conditions and events that might drive new countries to pursue nuclear weapons; the indicators and cautionary signs that can provide early warning that a country is interested in building nuclear bombs; and the policy and military measures that can be adopted to prevent or at least dissuade new proliferators. The introductory chapter develops a novel analytical approach focusing on the role of nuclear myths and mythmakers and the subsequent chapters draw on this approach to help analysts better understand and policy makers better manage nuclear proliferation over the next ten years.