This thesis is a historical analysis of the combat effectiveness of the German schwere Panzer-Abteilung or Heavy Tank Battalions during World War II. During the course of World War II, the German Army developed heavy tank battalions to fulfill the concept of breaking through enemy defenses so faster, lighter mechanized forces could exploit the rupture. These heavy tank battalions had several different tables of organization, but were always centered around either the Tiger or the Tiger II tank. They fought in virtually every theater of Europe against every enemy of Germany. Ultimately, the German military created eleven Army and three Waffen-SS heavy tank battalions. Of the Army battalions, the German command fielded ten as independent battalions, which were allocated to Army Groups as needed. The German Army assigned the last heavy tank battalion as an organic unit of the elite Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. The Waffen-SS allocated all of their battalions to a different Waffen-SS Corps. Because these units were not fielded until late in 1942, they did not participate in Germany’s major offensive operations that dominated the early part of World War II. Germany’s strategic situation after mid-1943 forced their military onto the defensive. Consequently, there are very few instances when heavy tank battalions attacked as a breakthrough force. During the latter part of the war, they were used in many different ways to provide defensive assistance along very wide frontages. This study assesses the German heavy tank battalions as generally effective, primarily because of the high kill ratio they achieved. However, based upon observations from a wide variety of examples, this study also outlines several areas where changes may have increased their effectiveness.

This book offers a unique perspective for understanding how and why the Second World War in Europe ended as it did—and why Germany, in attacking the Soviet Union, came far closer to winning the war than is often perceived. Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe challenges this conventional wisdom in highlighting how the re-establishment of the traditional German art of war—updated to accommodate new weapons systems—paved the way for Germany to forge a considerable military edge over its much larger potential rivals by playing to its qualitative strengths as a continental power. Ironically, these methodologies also created and exacerbated internal contradictions that undermined the same war machine and left it vulnerable to enemies with the capacity to adapt and build on potent military traditions of their own. The book begins by examining topics such as the methods by which the German economy and military prepared for war, the German military establishment's formidable strengths, and its weaknesses. The book then takes an entirely new perspective on explaining the Second World War in Europe. It demonstrates how Germany, through its invasion of the Soviet Union, came within a whisker of cementing a European-based empire that would have allowed the Third Reich to challenge the Anglo-American alliance for global hegemony—an outcome that by commonly cited measures of military potential Germany never should have had even a remote chance of accomplishing. The book's last section explores the final year of the war and addresses how Germany was able to hang on against the world's most powerful nations working in concert to engineer its defeat.

A new assessment of the Battle of the Bulge, the largest and bloodiest battle fought by U.S. forces in World War II, offers a balanced perspective that considers both the German and American viewpoints and discusses the failings of intelligence; Hitler's strategic grasp; effects of weather and influence of terrain; and differences in weaponry, understanding of aerial warfare, and doctrine.

Offers an authoritative account of the lesser-known yet devastatingly brutal battle waged by the Italian campaign during World War II.

Throughout 1943, the German army, heirs to a military tradition that demanded and perfected relentless offensive operations, succumbed to the realities of its own overreach and the demands of twentieth-century industrialized warfare. In his new study, prizewinning author Robert Citino chronicles this weakening Wehrmacht, now fighting desperately on the defensive but still remarkably dangerous and lethal. Drawing on his impeccable command of German-language sources, Citino offers fresh, vivid, and detailed treatments of key campaigns during this fateful year: the Allied landings in North Africa, General von Manstein's great counterstroke in front of Kharkov, the German attack at Kasserine Pass, the titanic engagement of tanks and men at Kursk, the Soviet counteroffensives at Orel and Belgorod, and the Allied landings in Sicily and Italy. Through these events, he reveals how a military establishment historically configured for violent aggression reacted when the tables were turned; how German commanders viewed their newest enemy, the U.S. Army, after brutal fighting against the British and Soviets; and why, despite their superiority in materiel and manpower, the Allies were unable to turn 1943 into a much more decisive year. Applying the keen operational analysis for which he is so highly regarded, Citino contends that virtually every flawed German decision-to defend Tunis, to attack at Kursk and then call off the offensive, to abandon Sicily, to defend Italy high up the boot and then down much closer to the toe-had strong supporters among the army's officer corps. He looks at all of these engagements from the perspective of each combatant nation and also establishes beyond a shadow of a doubt the synergistic interplay between the fronts. Ultimately, Citino produces a grim portrait of the German officer corps, dispelling the longstanding tendency to blame every bad decision on Hitler. Filled with telling vignettes and sharp portraits and copiously documented, The Wehrmacht Retreats is a dramatic and fast-paced narrative that will engage military historians and general readers alike.

"Although much is available about Tiger tanks' technical details and some of the most famous soldiers and units that employed them, until now, there has been little concerning the organization and tactical use of heavy tank battalions across the theaters in which they were employed. [Wilbeck] provides an in-depth look at heavy tank battalions' organizations and tactics, including the tactical doctrine by which these elite units were supposed to fight and case studies to illustrate how they were actually employed on the battlefield"--Page 4 of cover.

The German army faced tanks of superior size, armor and firepower from the outset of World War II. Although their Panzerwaffen handled the Polish campaign, war with France meant confronting superior heavy and medium tanks like the Char B and Somua, with 47 mm high velocity cannon that penetrated German tank armor with ease. French infantry disposed of effective antitank weapons and a portion of their 75 mm field guns were detailed as antitank guns. Even greater challenges emerged with the Russo-German War, for the Germans had no initial answer to the KV-1 heavy tank and T-34 medium. The successive technical shocks of superior tanks introduced by each side produced a gun-armor race that continued in some manner even after the war's end. The Germans placed a premium on technological quality and superiority over mass production, for which their industry (and, arguably, their regime) remained rather unsuited. Not satisfied with the advantage they obtained with the Tiger and Panther series tanks, the army leadership and Adolf Hitler himself pushed for larger and more powerful tanks than had ever been built.

This book tells—with firsthand accounts as well as numerous, never-before-seen photographs—the combat history of German Tiger Tank Battalion 503, the senior Tiger battalion of the German Army, equipped with both the Tiger I and the King Tiger. The unit saw action in the attempted relief of Stalingrad, the tremendous tank engagements at Kursk, and the bitter fighting to relieve German units encircled at the Tscherkassy Pocket. It then defended against the Allies in Normandy in 1944, and ended the war with desperate fighting in Hungary and Austria.