This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state’s counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor’s grand strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition – which is the non-state organization’s strategy for victory. To escape the attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become critical educational moments. The case studies presented here uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security studies.

Experts explore the sources of contemporary terrorism, what terrorists want, and how the United States and other countries should respond. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, scholars and policy analysts in national security have turned their attention to terrorism, considering not only how to prevent future attacks but also the roots of the problem. This book offers some of the latest research in terrorism studies. The contributors examine the sources of contemporary terrorism, discussing the impact of globalization, the influence of religious beliefs, and the increasing dissatisfaction felt by the world's powerless. They consider the strategies and motivations of terrorists, offering contending perspectives on whether or not terrorists can be said to achieve their goals; explore different responses to the threat of terrorism, discussing such topics as how the United States can work more effectively with its allies; and contemplate the future of al-Qaida, asking if its networked structure is an asset or a liability. The essays in Contending with Terrorism address some of the central topics in the analysis of contemporary terrorism. They promise to guide future policy and inspire further research into one of most important security issues of the twenty-first century. Contributors Max Abrahms, Daniel Byman, Erica Chenoweth, Audrey Kurth Cronin, Renée de Nevers, Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Hillel Frisch, Calvert Jones, Andrew Kydd, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Elizabeth McClellan, Nicholas Miller, Assaf Moghadam, Michael Mousseau, Rysia Murphy, William Rose, Paul Staniland, Robert Trager, Barbara Walter, Dessislava Zagorcheva

This book analyzes the way Israel has coped with nine wars of attrition from the 1950s to the recent Second Lebanon War (2006), questioning the belief that Western democracy cannot sustain prolonged wars of attrition. Challenging Israel with attrition has been compatible with the 'Arab way of war', which emphasizes staying power, and with the belief that democracies cannot tolerate wars of attrition, either economically or psychologically. Israel for its part developed a self-image of incapacity to sustain prolonged wars, committing itself to a traditional offensive approach to blitzkrieg, whenever possible. The book offers an account of nine wars of attrition that Israel was involved in over almost 60 years, from Palestinian infiltration and fedayeen activities against Israel in the early 1950s, through to the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The author uses these cases to challenge the myth that Israel cannot afford to become involved in a draining war of attrition. Focusing on central aspects typical of Western democracies engaged in wars of attrition – operational effectiveness; the societal staying power; the economic burden of the war; moral dilemmas; and conflict management problems - the book challenges the myth that Israel cannot afford to become involved in a draining war of attrition, while at the same time highlighting the fact that in its wars of attrition Israel has not always succeeded in avoiding undesired escalation. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, Israeli history, Middle Eastern politics, and security studies in general. Avi Kober is a member of the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University, Israel and is a Senior Research associate with the BESA Center for Strategic Studies.

A Modern History of Maritime Terrorism: From the Fenian Ram to Explosive-Laden Drone Boats is a comprehensive and insightful examination of the evolution of maritime terrorism in the modern era. Navigating the past, present and future of maritime terrorism, Peter Lehr outlines its history and definitions, its current manifestations, locations and actors, and its possible future trajectories.

"Suicide attacks are a defining act of political violence and an extraordinary social phenomenon. This book investigates the organizers of suicide missions and the perpetrators alike"--Provided by publisher.

Efforts at coordination between nations are at the heart of the challenges of globalization. Despite steadily growing interdependencies, individual nations still have specific interests that present obstacles to globalization. While some challenges inspired by the need to coordinate are viewed as inevitable by many, they are less optimistic about prospects for success. Jan-Erik Lane argues that one should focus objectively upon the possibility of failures.Lane analyzes four kinds of challenges to interdependency, all of which are growing in geopolitical relevance. First, countries need to diminish their dependency on fossil fuel and shift to a reliable supply of energy, because fossil fuels are diminishing. Second, environmental degradation must be addressed, because it is accelerating under the strain of earth's population. Lane advocates an ecological footprint approach. Third, a single global market economy and its complexities must be addressed, as national economies are increasingly opened. Finally, as traditional state sovereignty weakens, foreign military intervention in both international and intra-state conflicts increases.Governments are attempting to address these interdependencies, or reply to the challenges they pose, mainly through international organizations and regionalism. These efforts are discussed at length. In addition, problems with international law are reviewed, as Lane warns against the utopian hopes of global constitutionalism. Globalization also examines the potential consequences of failing to address the need for coordination in efforts to address shared global challenges.

A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics, politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in negotiations. Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway, and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War, this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces.

This book series contains some 18 years of warning and analysis published within the U.S. Congress by an organization known as the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. During its remarkably long life, the Task Force issued hundreds of reports comprising thousands of pages of warnings and analyses of the growing specter of the Islamist movement, its increasingly violent nature, and its selection of the Western world as its ultimate target. The depth and breadth of the Task Force's analytical efforts were unparalleled, as were its productive capacity and broad product distribution efforts. The Task Force's astonishing knowledge of the gathering storm that finally broke over New York City and Washington on that fateful September morning is represented in these pages.