This work - the first full-length account of its theme in English - identifies Kant’s doctrine of inner sense as a central, and problematic, element within the ‘architectonic of pure reason’ of the first Critique. Its exegesis exposes two, variant construals of the character and capacities of inner sense: the first, ‘positive’ construal functions in Kant’s account of the nature of knowledge in the Transcendental Analytic, while the second, ‘negative’ construal functions in Kant’s account of the limits of knowledge in the Transcendental Dialectic. Green shows how this variance underlies, and destabilizes, the basic intention of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, to give an account of both the nature, and the limits, of cognition. The work complements detailed analysis with an exhaustive review of English, French, and German scholarship on the doctrine. An Appendix on Kant’s recently discovered ‘Vom inneren Sinne’ fragment evinces Kant’s continued concern with this doctrine, and a Conclusion intimates the importance of Fichte’s and Schelling’s identification of the ‘aporia of inner sense’ to the subsequent development of transcendental idealism.

This volume is a collection of previously unpublished papers dealing with the neglected “phenomenological” dimension of the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, which it compares and contrasts to the phenomenology of his contemporary Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and to those of Edmund Husserl and his 20th century followers. Issues discussed include a comparision of the early phenomenological method in Fichte and Hegel with the classical phenomenological method in Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, as well as special topics, namely the problem of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity, very important in Fichte's trancendental philosophy of the Wissenschaftslehre but discussed as well in 20th century phenomenology. Fichte can be said to have invented the theory of intersubjectivity that was first developed by Hegel and then by Husserl, Sartre or Ricœur. Fichte can also be said to have in fact promoted a theory of intentionality based on tendencies, drives, purposes and will, that got a modern shape and language by Husserl and his followers. And even the deduction of the human body in Fichte's practical parts of the Wissenschaftslehre prepares the path for modern twentieth century theories of body, feeling and mind.

Falkenstein (U. of Western Ontario) focuses on one aspect of Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, namely, his position on how we manage to intuit the properties and relations of objects as they exist in time and space. In contrast to recent constructivist interpretations that stress the imposition of a structure through synthetic processes of the imagination or understanding, Falkenstein rehabilitates an interpretation of Kant outlined in the 19th century, arguing that our knowledge of objects in space and time is not grounded in concepts but in the quasi-physiological constitution of our senses. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

When the celebrated German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte lost his position at the University of Jena and moved to Berlin, it looked as if his career was over. In 1799 Berlin had no university, and Fichte was consigned to lecturing in his home. In Fichte in Berlin Matthew Nini breaks with scholarly consensus, arguing it was there that Fichte finally reached maturity, and the only way to understand Fichte’s mature philosophy is to perform it for oneself. The book focuses on the philosopher’s 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre – an untranslatable neologism for his theories on the pursuit of insight – claiming that they are one of the most exemplary versions of the philosophical project that Fichte reconfigured some seventeen times throughout his life. While the 1804 lectures offer a more robust approach, they remain faithful to the insight at the heart of the original philosophy. Fichte’s work always emphasized the practical over the theoretical, and his 1804 work goes even further: to think with Fichte is to bring one’s own philosophy to life. Nini guides the reader step by step through the complex arguments Fichte made in 1804 and goes on to examine some of his other works produced in their wake, arguing that Fichte’s output from 1804 to 1806, his first Berlin period, forms an organic whole. Fichte in Berlin is not only an introduction to Fichte’s later philosophy, but also an original philosophical work that makes a unique contribution to the study of German Idealism.

Abstracts of dissertations available on microfilm or as xerographic reproductions.

Psychoanalysis is often equated with Sigmund Freud, but this comparison ignores the wide range of clinical practices, observational methods, general theories, and cross-pollinations with other disciplines that characterise contemporary psychoanalytic work. Central psychoanalytic concepts to do with unconscious motivation, primitive forms of thought, defence mechanisms, and transference form a mainstay of today's richly textured contemporary clinical psychological practice. In this landmark collection on philosophy and psychoanalysis, leading researchers provide an evaluative overview of current thinking. Written at the interface between these two disciplines, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis contains original contributions that will shape the future of debate. With 34 chapters divided into eight sections covering history, clinical theory, phenomenology, science, aesthetics, religion, ethics, and political and social theory, this Oxford Handbook displays the enduring depth, breadth, and promise of integrating philosophical and psychoanalytic thought. Anyone interested in the philosophical implications of psychoanalysis, as well as philosophical challenges to and re-statements of psychoanalysis, will want to consult this book. It will be a vital resource for academic researchers, psychoanalysts and other mental health professionals, graduates, and trainees.