This original analysis examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Though all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and Zagzebski concludes that divine foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The discussion includes the relation between the foreknowledge dilemma and problems about the nature of time and the causal relation; the logic of counterfactual conditionals; and the differences between divine and human knowing states. An appendix introduces a new foreknowledge dilemma that purports to show that omniscient foreknowledge conflicts with deep intuitions about temporal asymmetry, quite apart from considerations of free will. Zagzebski shows that only a narrow range of solutions can handle this new dilemma. A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

Can human beings be free and responsible if there is a God? Anselm of Canterbury, the first Christian philosopher to propose that human beings have a really robust free will, offers viable answers to questions which have plagued religious people for at least two thousand years: If divine grace cannot be merited and is necessary to save fallen humanity, how can there be any decisive role for individual free choice to play? If God knows today what you are going to choose tomorrow, then when tomorrow comes you have to choose what God foreknew, so how can your choice be free? If human beings must have the option to choose between good and evil in order to be morally responsible, must God be able to choose evil? Anselm answers these questions with a sophisticated theory of free will which defends both human freedom and the sovereignty and goodness of God.

An accessible and engaging introduction to the philosophy of religion. Written with verve and clarity by a leading philosopher and contributor to the field Places key issues and debates in the philosophy of religion in their historical contexts, highlighting the conditions that led to the development of the field Addresses the core topics, among them the the existence of God, the problem of evil, death and the afterlife, and the problem of religious diversity Rich with argument, yet never obtrusive Forms part of the Fundamentals of Philosophy series, in which renowned scholars explore the fundamental issues and core problems in the major sub-disciplines of philosophy

First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The book collects previously published articles on fatalism and the relationship between divine foreknolwedge and human freedom and includes a substantial introductory essay and bibliography. The introductory essay seeks to provide an analytic framework for the articles, and it highlights connections between free will and recent work on metaphysical dependence.

Katherin A. Rogers presents a new theory of free will, based on the thought of Anselm of Canterbury. We did not originally produce ourselves. Yet, according to Anselm, we can engage in self-creation, freely and responsibly forming our characters by choosing 'from ourselves' (a se) between open options. Anselm introduces a new, agent-causal libertarianism which is parsimonious in that, unlike other agent-causal theories, it does not appeal to any unique and mysterious powers to explain how the free agent chooses. After setting out Anselm's original theory, Rogers defends and develops it by addressing a series of standard problems levelled against libertarianism. These include the problem of 'internalism--in that an agent is not the source of his original motivations, how can the structure of his choice ground his responsibility?; the problem of Frankfurt-style counterexamples--Do we really need open options to choose freely?; and the problem of luck--If nothing about an agent before he chooses explains his choice, then isn't the choice just dumb luck? (The Anselmian answer to this perennial criticism is especially innovative, proposing that the critic has the relationship between choices and character exactly backwards.) Finally, as a theory about self-creation, Anselmian Libertarianism must defend the tracing thesis, the claim that an agent can be responsible for character-determined choices, if he, himself, formed his character through earlier a se choices. Throughout, the book defends and exemplifies a new methodological suggestion: someone debating free will ought to make his background world view explicit. In the on-going debate over the possibility of human freedom and responsibility, Anselmian Libertarianism constitutes a new and plausible approach.

John C. Peckham introduces and engages with major questions about God's nature and how God relates to the world. Does God change? Does God have emotions? Can God do anything? Does God know the future? Does God always attain what God desires? And is God entirely good? This textbook provides a clear and concise overview of the issues involved in these and other questions, exploring prominent contemporary approaches to the main issues relative to how to conceive of the God-world relationship within Christian theology. In so doing, Peckham surveys a range of live options regarding each of the primary questions, briefly considering where each falls within the spectrum of the Christian tradition and providing clear and readily understandable explanations of the technical issues involved. The result is a stimulating survey of the most prominent options in Christian theology relative to divine attributes and the God-world relationship, offered in an accessible format for students. Designed for classroom use this volume includes the following features: - study questions for each chapter - suggestions for further reading for each chapter - glossary

When Gene Long, editor of Kluwer's Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion Series, first invited me to write the volume on Analytic Philosophy of Religion, I accepted with great enthusiasm. My only explanation for that enthusiasm now is that I was younger and more naive at the time. Soon after starting work on the volume, my enthusiasm was dampened by the daunting magnitude of the task. I began as a sprinter and quickly settled into the pace of a long-distance runner. Although I considered myself well read in the subject, I soon discovered that I had a great deal of research to do to be confident that I had considered all of the major contributions to the various discussions, issues, and of religion. As I read more and more problems found within analytic philosophy books and articles, I realized that I had rushed into a territory already well trodden by the angels. I am greatly impressed by the sophistication and subtlety of philosophical argument that characterize the different debates in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. This volume covers a vast amount of material. I have endeavored to provide the fairest possible reading of different authors, and, in cases where I include my own critical evaluations and develop my own positions, I have endeavored to provide the strongest possible interpretations of the positions I criticize.

A core topic in metaphysics, time is also central to issues in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. Debates in the Metaphysics of Time explores these close philosophical connections and tackles the contemporary debates using an interactive approach. Contributors put forward their views before commenting on the ideas of other contributors and defending against objections. Divided into 'metaphysics and time', 'consciousness and time' and 'God, time and human freedom', chapters are organized around key questions, including: • How are we to understand the passage of time, or the 'change' an event seems to undergo when it moves from the future to the present and then recedes into the more and more distant past? • Can we only be directly aware of what is momentary if we directly experience change and duration? • How is God related to time and is divine foreknowledge and human freedom compatible? For students and researchers looking to understand the latest arguments in the philosophy of time, Debates in the Metaphysics of Time provides an original, up-to-date and accessible account of past, present and future debates.

In this first volume Blake T. Ostler explores Christian and Mormon notions about God. Written for both Mormons and non-Mormons interested in the relationship between Mormonism and classical theism, his path-breaking Exploring Mormon Thought: The Attributes of God is a critique of classical theism regarding some of the central concepts that have formed the Christian understanding of God. He deals with questions of traditional philosophical theology including free will and foreknowledge, the nature of God and Christology. The approach to these questions is from the analytic philosophical tradition and includes detailed arguments relating to the coherence of Christian belief, scripture and practice. However he recognizes that religious faith is far more a product of intimacy with the divine than of ultimacy of reason, more a product of relationships than of logical necessities. He provides an overview of the most influential Christian notions of deity, exploring themes and resources within this discourse that might be helpful to Latter-day Saint explorations. Also highlighted are various perspectives within Mormonism itself including a detailed analysis of Joseph Smith's Lectures on Faith and discussion of the thought of Orson and Parley Pratt, B. H. Roberts and John Widstoe. Earlier Mormon thought is demonstrated to have included a concept of God as a being in process. He suggests areas in which Mormon approaches to questions about free agency and God's omnipotence might suggest resolutions to some of the difficult issues that have troubled theologians and philosophers for centuries. For the first time ever Ostler formulates a systematic Mormon Christology.