Moral expectation is a concept with which all of us are well acquainted. Already as children we learn that certain courses of action are expected of us. We are expected to perform certain actions, and we are expected to refrain from other actions. Furthermore, we learn that something is morally wrong with the failure to do what we are morally expected to do. A central theme of this book is that moral expectation should not be confused with moral obligation. While we are morally expected to do everything we are obligated to do, a person can be morally expected to do some things that he or she is not morally obligated to do. Although moral expectation is a familiar notion, it has not been the object of investigation in its own right. In the early chapters Mellema attempts to provide a philosophical account of this familiar notion, distinguish it from other types of expectations, and show how it is possible to form false moral expectations. Subsequent chapters explore the role of moral expectation in agreements between people, analyze ways that people avoid moral expectation, illustrate how groups can have moral expectations, and view moral expectation in the context of our relationship with divine beings. The final chapter provides insight into how moral expectation operates in people's professional lives.

From the castigation and stigmatization of victims of AIDS to our celebration of diet, exercise and fitness, the moral categorization of health and disease reflects contemporary notions that disease results from moral failure and that health is the representation of moral triumph. Ranging across academic disciplines and historical time periods, the essays in Morality and Health offer a compelling assessment of the powerful role of moral systems for judging the complex questions of risk and responsibility for disease, the experience of illness, and social and cultural responses to those who are sick. Contributors include Keith Thomas, Charles Rosenberg, Richard Shweder, Arthur Kleinman, David Mechanic, Nancy Tomes and Linda Gordon.

Extensive news coverage of humanitarian crises, especially on television, has led to a strong public awareness of the importance of humanitarian activities. This innovative book examines the evolution of Japan’s response to humanitarian crises, placing it in the context of global debates on humanitarianism. Tracing developments from the Meiji period through to the present day, the book explores the broader cultural and historical framework within which Japanese humanitarian ideas and attitudes to human rights have developed. Taking a multi-disciplinary approach the book analyzes Japan’s humanitarian ideas, values and social practices, exploring the changing perceptions and attitudes to overseas assistance. Based on primary research including interview material it provides a deeper understanding of the upsurge in Japanese involvement in humanitarian crises, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. It includes a variety of case studies with a detailed consideration of Japan’s assistance in East Timor. Nishikawa analyzes the case from historical, geographical and political perspectives, illustrating the strategic and political considerations that have influenced the shape of Japan’s humanitarian activities.

Hannaford shows that doing (reasoning and acting morally) and being (our "moral anatomy" or essential nature) do not exist in a vacuum but are rooted in community, in our relations with others. Moral reasoning, he argues, focuses on what we ought to do in a situation where we must consider the needs, desires, and expectations of others.

This book advances a new interpretation of Hart’s penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal/constraint approach. Rather, it is argued, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This original interpretation is not based only on Hart’s key volume on the subject Punishment and Responsibility, but on a careful reading of his complete works. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers interested in Hart’s philosophy, the philosophy of law and criminal law.

In this final revision of the classic work, the author has produced the fullest and most sophisticated account of this influential theoretical model. Here, he makes clear that morality is an informal system that does not provide unique answers to every moral question but does always limit the range of morally acceptable options, and so explains why some moral disagreements cannot be resolved. The importance placed on the moral ideals also makes clear that the moral rules are only one part of the moral system. A chapter that is devoted to justifying violations of the rules illustrates how the moral rules are embedded in the system and cannot be adequately understood independently of it. The chapter on reasons includes a new account of what makes one reason better than another and elucidates the complex hybrid nature of rationality.

The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility comprehensively addresses questions about who is responsible and how blame or praise should be attributed when human agents act together. Such questions include: Do individuals share responsibility for the outcome or are individuals responsible only for their contribution to the act? Are individuals responsible for actions done by their group even when they don’t contribute to the outcome? Can a corporation or institution be held morally responsible apart from the responsibility of its members? The Handbook’s 35 chapters—all appearing here for the first time and written by an international team of experts—are organized into four parts: Part I: Foundations of Collective Responsibility Part II: Theoretical Issues in Collective Responsibility Part III: Domains of Collective Responsibility Part IV: Applied Issues in Collective Responsibility Each part begins with a short introduction that provides an overview of issues and debates within that area and a brief summary of its chapters. In addition, a comprehensive index allows readers to better navigate the entirety of the volume’s contents. The result is the first major work in the field that serves as an instructional aid for those in advanced undergraduate courses and graduate seminars, as well as a reference for scholars interested in learning more about collective responsibility.

Originally published in 1987, this book discusses how matters of fact influence moral judgments and also how the judgments themselves influence facts. It demonstrates that ethics is a practical subject affecting our moral assessment of inter-personal behaviour and the conduct of public affairs. It is designed as in introduction to moral philosophy for first-year undergraduates and provides an excellent basis for further study as well as serving as a valuable background text for those whose primary interests are in law, politics, sociology, social history and education.