From the first days of his unexpected presidency in April 1945 through the landmark NSC 68 of 1950, Harry Truman was central to the formation of America’s grand strategy during the Cold War and the subsequent remaking of U.S. foreign policy. Others are frequently associated with the terminology of and responses to the perceived global Communist threat after the Second World War: Walter Lippmann popularized the term “cold war,” and George F. Kennan first used the word “containment” in a strategic sense. Although Kennan, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall have been seen as the most influential architects of American Cold War foreign policy, The First Cold Warrior draws on archives and other primary sources to demonstrate that Harry Truman was the key decision maker in the critical period between 1945 and 1950. In a significant reassessment of the thirty-third president and his political beliefs, Elizabeth Edwards Spalding contends that it was Truman himself who defined and articulated the theoretical underpinnings of containment. His practical leadership style was characterized by policies and institutions such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Berlin airlift, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. Part of Truman’s unique approach—shaped by his religious faith and dedication to anti-communism—was to emphasize the importance of free peoples, democratic institutions, and sovereign nations. With these values, he fashioned a new liberal internationalism, distinct from both Woodrow Wilson’s progressive internationalism and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s liberal pragmatism, which still shapes our politics. Truman deserves greater credit for understanding the challenges of his time and for being America’s first cold warrior. This reconsideration of Truman’s overlooked statesmanship provides a model for interpreting the international crises facing the United States in this new era of ideological conflict.

In America's Cold Warrior, James Graham Wilson traces Paul Nitze's career path in national security after World War II, a time when many of his mentors and peers returned to civilian life. Serving in eight presidential administrations, Nitze commanded White House attention even when he was out of government, especially with his withering criticism of Jimmy Carter during Carter's presidency. While Nitze is perhaps best known for leading the formulation of NSC-68, which Harry Truman signed in 1950, Wilson contends that Nitze's most significant contribution to American peace and security came in the painstaking work done in the 1980s to negotiate successful treaties with the Soviets to reduce nuclear weapons while simultaneously deflecting skeptics surrounding Ronald Reagan. America's Cold Warrior connects Nitze's career and concerns about strategic vulnerability to the post-9/11 era and the challenges of the 2020s, where the United States finds itself locked in geopolitical competition with the People's Republic of China and Russia.

In The First Cold War, Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani review the Wilson administration’s attitudes toward Russia before, during, and after the Bolshevik seizure of power. They argue that before the Russian Revolution, Woodrow Wilson had little understanding of Russia and made poor appointments that cost the United States Russian goodwill. Wilson later reversed those negative impressions by being the first to recognize Russia’s Provisional Government, resulting in positive U.S.–Russian relations until Lenin gained power in 1917. Wilson at first seemed unsure whether to recognize or repudiate Lenin and the Bolsheviks. His vacillation finally ended in a firm repudiation when he opted for a diplomatic quarantine having almost all of the ingredients of the later Cold War. Davis and Trani argue that Wilson deserves mild criticism for his early indecision and inability to form a coherent policy toward what would become the Soviet Union. But they believe Wilson rightly came to the conclusion that until the regime became more moderate, it was useless for America to engage it diplomatically. The authors see in Wilson’s approach the foundations for the “first Cold War”—meaning not simply a refusal to recognize the Soviet Union, but a strong belief that its influence was harmful and would spread if not contained or quarantined. Wilson’s Soviet policy in essence lasted until Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition in the 1930s. But The First Cold War suggests that Wilson’s impact extended beyond Roosevelt to Truman, showing that the policies of Wilson and Truman closely resemble each other with the exception of an arms race. Wilson’s intellectual reputation lent credibility to U.S. Cold War policy from Truman to Reagan, and the reader can draw a direct connection from Wilson to the collapse of the USSR. Wilsonians were the first Cold War warriors, and in the era of President Woodrow Wilson, the first Cold War began.

At the height of the first Cold War in the early 1950s, the Western powers worried that occupied Austria might become 'Europe's Korea' and feared a Communist takeover. The Soviets exploited their occupation zone for maximum reparations. American economic aid guaranteed Austria's survival and economic reconstruction. Their military assistance turned Austria into a 'secret ally' of the West. Austrian diplomacy played a vital role in securing the Austrian treaty in bilateral negotiations with Stalin's successors in the Kremlin demonstrating the leverage of the weak in the Cold War.

A reexamination of America's overloaded foreign policy tradition and its importance for global politics today Debates about U.S. foreign policy have revolved around three main traditions—liberal internationalism, realism, and nationalism. In this book, distinguished political scientist Henry Nau delves deeply into a fourth, overlooked foreign policy tradition that he calls "conservative internationalism." This approach spreads freedom, like liberal internationalism; arms diplomacy, like realism; and preserves national sovereignty, like nationalism. It targets a world of limited government or independent "sister republics," not a world of great power concerts or centralized international institutions. Nau explores conservative internationalism in the foreign policies of Thomas Jefferson, James Polk, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan. These presidents did more than any others to expand the arc of freedom using a deft combination of force, diplomacy, and compromise. Since Reagan, presidents have swung back and forth among the main traditions, overreaching under Bush and now retrenching under Obama. Nau demonstrates that conservative internationalism offers an alternative way. It pursues freedom but not everywhere, prioritizing situations that border on existing free countries—Turkey, for example, rather than Iraq. It uses lesser force early to influence negotiations rather than greater force later after negotiations fail. And it reaches timely compromises to cash in military leverage and sustain public support. A groundbreaking revival of a neglected foreign policy tradition, Conservative Internationalism shows how the United States can effectively sustain global leadership while respecting the constraints of public will and material resources.

Based on recently declassified documents, this book provides the first examination of the Truman Administration’s decision to employ covert operations in the Cold War. Although covert operations were an integral part of America’s arsenal during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the majority of these operations were ill conceived, unrealistic and ultimately doomed to failure. In this volume, the author looks at three central questions: Why were these types of operations adopted? Why were they conducted in such a haphazard manner? And, why, once it became clear that they were not working, did the administration fail to abandon them? The book argues that the Truman Administration was unable to reconcile policy, strategy and operations successfully, and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the Cold War. This ensured that they wasted time and effort, money and manpower on covert operations designed to challenge Soviet hegemony, which had little or no real chance of success. US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, Cold War history, intelligence and international history in general.

Brexit, populism, and Euroscepticism seem to have challenged old assumptions about European integration and raised the prospect of disintegration. This book re-examines why the European Union and its forerunners were created and investigates how and why they have changed. It links contemporary events to historical explanation, arguing that there were long-term sets of conditions, dating back to the 1920s, which pushed European governments to cooperate economically and to try to resolve their diplomatic differences. The failure of the French and German governments to create what Aristide Briand had called a 'European federal union' demonstrated both the precariousness of the enterprise and its connection to the domestic politics of European states. After 1945, the unexpected advent of a 'Cold War' and the military, diplomatic and economic presence of the United States in Europe facilitated the gradual development of habits of cooperation and institutional 'integration', but they also placed limits on European governments' activities, as did disagreements between political parties and the expectations of citizens. As a consequence, supranational bodies such as the European Commission have been accompanied - and often overshadowed - by intergovernmental institutions such as the European Council, with the EU as a whole functioning in important respects as a type of confederation. The volume addresses a series of large-scale historical questions which are integral to an understanding of the European Union. It asks how and why citizens of member states have identified with the EU; how matters of 'security' affected the development of the European Community during and after the Cold War; whether economic and social convergence have taken place, and with what consequences; and why European institutions have come to function as they have. The study is thematic, focusing on the most important aspects of European integration and explaining why member states have decided to carry out - or have consented to - the unique experiment of the European Union.

This two-volume set provides a chronological view of the foreign policy/national security doctrines of key American presidents from Washington to Obama, framed by commentary on the historical context for each, discussions of major themes, and examinations of the lasting impact of these policies. The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape our Present and Future provides a chronological examination of the foreign policy and national security doctrines of key American presidents from Washington to Obama, covering everything from our missionary zeal and our pursuit of open navigation of the seas, to our involvement in the ongoing political and military conflicts in the Middle East. It addresses the multiple sources behind the doctrines: real, rhetorical, and ideological. Arranged chronologically, each chapter offers commentary on the historical evolution of these doctrines, identifies the major themes, and highlights unique revelations. Ideal for universities, colleges, libraries, academics, classroom teachers, policy makers, and the educated electorate, this two-volume set represents a compendium of national security doctrines that explains how these first doctrines have constrained, restrained, and guided every American president regardless of party, providing comprehensive information that cannot be found in any other single source. Further, the work presents the reader with examples and explanations of precisely how these doctrines from long ago as well as those from recent history directly affect our present and future.

How the history of liberal order and democratic politics since the 1930s explains ongoing threats to democracy and international order The liberal democratic order that seemed so stable in North America and Western Europe has become precarious. James E. Cronin argues that liberalism has never been secure and that since the 1930s the international order has had to be crafted, redeployed, and extended in response to both victories and setbacks. Beginning with the German and Japanese efforts in the 1930s to establish a system based on empire, race, economic protectionism, and militant nationalism, Cronin shows how the postwar system, established out of a revulsion at the ideas of fascism, repeatedly reinvented itself in the face of the Cold War, anticolonial insurgencies, the economic and political crises of the 1970s, the collapse of communism, the rise of globalization, and the financial crisis of 2008. Cronin emphasizes the links between internal and external politics in sustaining liberal order internationally and the domestic origins and correlates of present difficulties. Fragile Victory provides the context necessary to understand such diverse challenges as the triumph of Brexit, the election of Trump, the rise of populism, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.