The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) was introduced as part of a package of reforms to the Fund’s lending facilities in March 2009. The following provides operational guidance and further background information on the FCL. SPR (the Emerging Markets Division), FIN, and LEG stand ready to clarify any further questions departments may have on the FCL or other aspects of the reforms to lending and conditionality.

"This note provides general guidance on the use of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL). After an overview of the instrument, explaining its specific nature, the operational issues are grouped into three areas: • an outline of the process and specific steps that need to be followed if a member expresses interest in an arrangement; • guidance on determining qualification of a member; and • a how-to guide for determining appropriate access levels. The note is an aid to the implementation of the policy and its underlying principles. If there is any instance in which a provision of the guidance note or its implementation conflicts with Board policy, Board policy prevails. It will be revised as needed, for example following relevant policy reviews."

With the creation of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and Precautionary Credit Line (PCL), the Fund’s GRA toolkit was overhauled to address gaps in the Fund’s crisis prevention and resolution toolkit. The innovative and flexible nature of the new instruments was meant to reduce stigma from using Fund resources, underpinning confidence in its users amid stressed market conditions. Yet, there have been a limited number of members with these Using a variety of methodological tools, this review assesses experience with the instruments, arrangements. Using a variety of methodological tools, this review assesses experience with the instruments, reflects on the appropriateness of their design, and recommends refinements to enhance their effectiveness.

The Background Notes in this Supplement provide essential context and analysis needed to understand the problem of governance and corruption, its impact on the economies of Fund members, and the history and nature of Fund engagement on these issues. They also seek to support the assessment of the Fund’s overall approach to promoting good governance and reducing corruption—including through the lenses of key stakeholders—with a view to identifying strength and closing any remaining gaps.

We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international “rules of the game” for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF’s lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund’s lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund’s financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012.

As foreshadowed in the Executive Board Report to the IMFC on the Fund’s Mandate, this technical note sketches the procedures under which synchronized approval of Flexible Credit Line (FCL) arrangements for multiple member countries could be undertaken under the existing FCL Decision and other Fund policies.1 When multiple members face the same shock, synchronized approval of FCL arrangements could strengthen the effectiveness of the response to the common shock and minimize first-mover problems. This technical note neither modifies existing Fund policies, nor establishes a new financing instrument.

The Fund’s precautionary toolkit rests on the simple proposition that facilitating crisis prevention is far less costly than crisis resolution. Its value increases with systemic risk. Serial shocks to the global trading and financial systems pose significant and persistent headwinds for well-integrated emerging markets. An adequately funded global financial safety net (GFSN) with a suite of precautionary tools allows qualifying members to respond to balance of payments (BoP) shocks, reducing the incidence of crises and limiting contagion. The Fund is the only layer of the GFSN available to all members; other layers vary in their availability and externalities. In this context, the overarching objective of this review of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL), and Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) is to ensure that the precautionary facilities toolkit (henceforth “the toolkit”) is fit for purpose for the challenges ahead.

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This review of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), and the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) focuses on four key issues: (i) the demand for the FCL and PLL in the context of the broader role of the Fund’s lending (including precautionary) instruments in the global financial safety net (GFSN); (ii) the qualification/conditionality framework for the FCL and the PLL; (iii) concerns about repeated usage of FCL arrangements by the same members and consideration of ways to further improve the transparency in the discussion of access/exit in the underlying staff documents; and (iv) the lack of demand for the RFI.

"This note provides general guidance on the use of the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). After an overview of the instrument, explaining its specific nature, the operational issues are grouped into five areas: • an outline of the process and specific steps that need to be followed if a member expresses interest in an arrangement; • guidance on access, phasing, and purchases; • guidance on determining qualification of a member and appropriate ex-post conditionality; and • a guide to the semi-annual review process. The note is an aid to the implementation of the policy and its underlying principles. If there is any instance in which a provision of the guidance note or its implementation conflicts with Board policy, Board policy prevails. It will be revised as needed, for example following relevant policy reviews."