An analysis of the negotiations, both international and domestic, behind this landmark treaty through the words of those directly involved. This book analyzes the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear force missiles through vivid, fresh impressions by those who conducted the INF negotiations. The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough brings this period to life through the writing of key participants in the seminal negotiations leading to the completion of the INF Treaty and the ensuing epic struggle to secure its ratification by the U.S. Senate. The book provides an astute balance between the assessments of senior negotiators; “nuts and bolts” observations on specific elements of the Treaty by in-the-trenches negotiators; the tangles that challenged the keenest of legal minds; and the political maneuvers required to bring it through the pits and deadfalls of the Senate. Additionally, The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough provides an often-forgotten perspective of the moment, offering the opportunity for retrospective judgment. Is there a test that time demands? Are there “lessons learned,” conceived at the time, that still pass that test?

This title was first published 2000: The book applies constructivist arguments about culture, norms and identity to explain the superpower negotiations that produced the INF Treaty. It contributes to the constructivist research program in two ways. First, it develops a speech act model of social interaction to illustrate constructivist arguments and second, it develops a constructivist theory of security dilemmas that suggests practical ways to resolve them. The substantive conclusion of the book is that the dominant understanding of the end of the Cold War (the buildup argument) is not correct as it advocates policies that tend to perpetuate conflicts. Instead this book argues that the 'new thinking' explanation is more coherent and suggests improved practical ways to resolve other security dilemmas.

The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), signed in 1987, eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers from the United States and Soviet arsenals. The treaty was a diplomatic watershed, signaling the beginning of the end of the Cold War, and has served as a basis for security and stability of Europe. However, the security environment has changed dramatically in the past twenty years. To develop and deploy a new generation of land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the United States would have to withdraw from the Treaty. Such an action would have significant political and military implications. The study attempts to explore and illuminate some potential responses of critical international actors, such as Russia, China, and America's NATO and East Asian allies, to fully understand the expected costs that may be incurred over time. The study concludes with a consideration of potential ways forward for the United States to provide policymakers with guidance on how to proceed in both diplomatic and political-military terms to best address the missile-proliferation threat.

With the signing of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty in December 1987, a chapter in NATO history came to an end. This agreement eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons from Europe. This volume analyzes the possible repercussions of the INF treaty in the context of NATO's overall doctrine of flexible response, and concludes that the U.S. and NATO must adopt arms and arms control policies consistent with one another and with NATO doctrine. Co-published with the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.