An analysis of the negotiations, both international and domestic, behind this landmark treaty through the words of those directly involved. This book analyzes the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear force missiles through vivid, fresh impressions by those who conducted the INF negotiations. The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough brings this period to life through the writing of key participants in the seminal negotiations leading to the completion of the INF Treaty and the ensuing epic struggle to secure its ratification by the U.S. Senate. The book provides an astute balance between the assessments of senior negotiators; “nuts and bolts” observations on specific elements of the Treaty by in-the-trenches negotiators; the tangles that challenged the keenest of legal minds; and the political maneuvers required to bring it through the pits and deadfalls of the Senate. Additionally, The Reagan-Gorbachev Arms Control Breakthrough provides an often-forgotten perspective of the moment, offering the opportunity for retrospective judgment. Is there a test that time demands? Are there “lessons learned,” conceived at the time, that still pass that test?

This title was first published 2000: The book applies constructivist arguments about culture, norms and identity to explain the superpower negotiations that produced the INF Treaty. It contributes to the constructivist research program in two ways. First, it develops a speech act model of social interaction to illustrate constructivist arguments and second, it develops a constructivist theory of security dilemmas that suggests practical ways to resolve them. The substantive conclusion of the book is that the dominant understanding of the end of the Cold War (the buildup argument) is not correct as it advocates policies that tend to perpetuate conflicts. Instead this book argues that the 'new thinking' explanation is more coherent and suggests improved practical ways to resolve other security dilemmas.

The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), signed in 1987, eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers from the United States and Soviet arsenals. The treaty was a diplomatic watershed, signaling the beginning of the end of the Cold War, and has served as a basis for security and stability of Europe. However, the security environment has changed dramatically in the past twenty years. To develop and deploy a new generation of land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the United States would have to withdraw from the Treaty. Such an action would have significant political and military implications. The study attempts to explore and illuminate some potential responses of critical international actors, such as Russia, China, and America's NATO and East Asian allies, to fully understand the expected costs that may be incurred over time. The study concludes with a consideration of potential ways forward for the United States to provide policymakers with guidance on how to proceed in both diplomatic and political-military terms to best address the missile-proliferation threat.

The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2016 report, it noted that "the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a groundlaunched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." The compliance reports do not offer further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. The United States has raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings have made little progress because Russia continues to deny that it has violated the treaty. The United States could pursue a number of options that might move the diplomatic process forward and possibly lead to a resolution of the issue. It could call a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns, so that both sides could raise their concerns and explain their programs. It could begin studies and research into new INF-range systems, which is permitted by the treaty, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces. The United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond if Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty and deploys new INF-range missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities-including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities-to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.