Pt. 1: This volume describes those JCS activities related to developments in Vietnam during the period 1960-1963, when the United States expanded its initial military commitment to Southeast Asia. In 1960, the United States increased its military advisory strength in South Vietnam in response to increased Communist infiltration and to more sustained guerrilla attacks in the south and its contingency planning effort to deploy regular US forces to both Laos and South Vietnam to counter any threat by Communist Army units from the north or from China. President Kennedy's called for a new emphasis upon guerrilla warfare at first received only lukewarm support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the failed Bay of Pigs episode very early in the Kennedy administration, the President lost faith in the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his intermediary with the Joint Chiefs, until he assumed the Chairman responsibilities in October 1962. The Kennedy administration's policy was marked by clashes between factions in the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the White House. By 1963, these differences involved the support the US should provide for the Republic of Vietnam under its President, Ngo Dinh Diem. The history ends with the killing of Diem by a coup followed by the coincidental murder of President Kennedy a short time later.

Pt. 1: This volume describes those JCS activities related to developments in Vietnam during the period 1960-1963, when the United States expanded its initial military commitment to Southeast Asia. In 1960, the United States increased its military advisory strength in South Vietnam in response to increased Communist infiltration and to more sustained guerrilla attacks in the south and its contingency planning effort to deploy regular US forces to both Laos and South Vietnam to counter any threat by Communist Army units from the north or from China. President Kennedy's called for a new emphasis upon guerrilla warfare at first received only lukewarm support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the failed Bay of Pigs episode very early in the Kennedy administration, the President lost faith in the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his intermediary with the Joint Chiefs, until he assumed the Chairman responsibilities in October 1962. The Kennedy administration's policy was marked by clashes between factions in the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the White House. By 1963, these differences involved the support the US should provide for the Republic of Vietnam under its President, Ngo Dinh Diem. The history ends with the killing of Diem by a coup followed by the coincidental murder of President Kennedy a short time later.

General Wallace M. Greene Jr. was the 23d Commandant of the Marine Corps, serving from 1964 to 1967, a period in which American involvement in Vietnam increased dramatically. The Greene Papers: General Wallace M. Greene Jr. and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, January 1964-March 1965 contains more than 100 documents from the personal papers of General Greene and is the first edited volume of personal papers to be published by the Marine Corps History Division as a monograph. Produced by a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Greene's notes provide readers with a firsthand account from one of the main participants in the decision-making process that led to the commitment of a large-scale American expeditionary force in Southeast Asia. Because of President Lyndon B. Johnson's reticence to regularly consult the Joint Chiefs on military matters, however, the notes also give readers a second point of view: that of a frustrated advisor kept on the outside and forced to look in, observe, and reflect on major military decisions often made without his input or support. Also apparent are the tensions between Greene and President Johnson's aggressive and domineering Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. This volume begins in January 1964 and ends just before the landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang on 8 March 1965, a pivotal moment that marked the official transition from the United States' advisory mission to a more active combat mission. In doing so, it traces Greene's growing frustration with McNamara's and Johnson's equivocation and uncertainty about Southeast Asia. Along with a series of commemorative pamphlets, this book is part of the Marine Corps History Division's effort to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Vietnam War. Other publications avaialble from the United States Marine Corps can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/922 Other publications about the Vietnam War can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/vietnam-war