This book focuses on the British Commonwealth armies in SE Asia and the SW Pacific during the Second World War, which, following the disastrous Malayan and Burma campaigns, had to hurriedly re-train, re-equip and re-organise their demoralised troops to fight a conventional jungle war against the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). British, Indian and Australian troops faced formidable problems conducting operations across inaccessible, rugged and jungle-covered mountains on the borders of Burma, in New Guinea and on the islands of the SW Pacific. Yet within a remarkably short time they adapted to the exigencies of conventional jungle warfare and later inflicted shattering defeats on the Japanese. This study will trace how the military effectiveness of the Australian Army and the last great imperial British Army in SE Asia was so dramatically transformed, with particular attention to the two key factors of tactical doctrine and specialised training in jungle warfare. It will closely examine how lessons were learnt and passed on between the British, Indian and Australian armies. The book will also briefly cover the various changes in military organisation, medical support and equipment introduced by the military authorities in SE Asia and Australia, as well as covering the techniques evolved to deliver effective air support to ground troops. To demonstrate the importance of these changes, the battlefield performance of imperial troops in such contrasting operations as the First Arakan Campaign, fighting along the Kokoda Trail and the defeat of the IJA at Imphal and Kohima will be described in detail.

This book focuses on the British Commonwealth armies in SE Asia and the SW Pacific during the Second World War, which, following the disastrous Malayan and Burma campaigns, had to hurriedly re-train, re-equip and re-organise their demoralised troops to fight a conventional jungle war against the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). British, Indian and Australian troops faced formidable problems conducting operations across inaccessible, rugged and jungle-covered mountains on the borders of Burma, in New Guinea and on the islands of the SW Pacific. Yet within a remarkably short time they adapted to the exigencies of conventional jungle warfare and later inflicted shattering defeats on the Japanese. This study will trace how the military effectiveness of the Australian Army and the last great imperial British Army in SE Asia was so dramatically transformed, with particular attention to the two key factors of tactical doctrine and specialised training in jungle warfare. It will closely examine how lessons were learnt and passed on between the British, Indian and Australian armies. The book will also briefly cover the various changes in military organisation, medical support and equipment introduced by the military authorities in SE Asia and Australia, as well as covering the techniques evolved to deliver effective air support to ground troops. To demonstrate the importance of these changes, the battlefield performance of imperial troops in such contrasting operations as the First Arakan Campaign, fighting along the Kokoda Trail and the defeat of the IJA at Imphal and Kohima will be described in detail.

Barkawi re-imagines the study of war with imperial and multinational armies that fought in Asia in the Second World War.

The Indian Army was one of the most important colonial institutions that the British created. From its humble origins as a mercantile police force to a modern contemporary army in the Second World War, this institution underwent many transitions. This book examines the Indian Army during the later colonial era from the First Afghan War in 1839 to Indian independence in 1947. During this period, the Indian Army developed from an internal policing force, to a frontier army, and then to a conventional western style fighting force capable of deployment to overseas’ theaters. These transitions resulted in significant structural and doctrinal changes in the army. The doctrines, and tactics honed during this period would have a dramatic impact upon the post-colonial armies of India and Pakistan. From civil-military relations to fighting and structural doctrines, the Indian and Pakistani armies closely reflect the deep-seated impact of decades of evolution during the late colonial era.

Jonathan Fennell captures for the first time the true wartime experience of the ordinary soldiers from across the empire who made up the British and Commonwealth armies. He analyses why the great battles were won and lost and how the men that fought went on to change the world.

This book offers diverse and original perspectives on South Asia’s imperial military history. Unlike prevailing studies, the chapters in the volume emphasize both the vital role of culture in framing imperial military practice and the multiple cultural effects of colonial military service and engagements. The volume spans from the early East India Company period through to the Second World War and India’s independence, exploring themes such as the military in the field and at leisure, as well as examining the effects of imperial deployments in South Asia and across the British Empire. Drawing extensively on new archival research, the book integrates previously disparate accounts of imperial military history and raises new questions about culture and operational practice in the colonial Indian Army. This work will be of interest to scholars and researchers of modern South Asian history, war and strategic studies, military history, the British Empire, as well as politics and international relations.

The Indian Army was the largest volunteer army during the Second World War. Indian Army divisions fought in the Middle East, North Africa and Italy - and went to make up the overwhelming majority of the troops in South East Asia. Over two million personnel served in the Indian Army - and India provided the base for supplies for the Middle Eastern and South East Asian theatres. This monograph is a modern historical interpretation of the Indian Army as a holistic organisation during the Second World War. It will look at training in India - charting how the Indian Army developed a more comprehensive training structure than any other Commonwealth country. This was achieved through both the dissemination of doctrine and the professionalism of a small coterie of Indian Army officers who brought about a military culture within the Indian Army - starting in the 1930s - that came to fruition during the Second World War, which informed the formal learning process. Finally, it will show that the Indian Army was reorganised after experiences of the First World War. During the interwar period, the army developed training and belief for both fighting on the North West Frontier, and as an aid to civil power. With the outbreak of the Second World War, in addition to these roles, the army had to expand and adapt to fighting modern professional armies in the difficult terrains of desert, jungle and mountain warfare. A clear development of doctrine and training can be seen, with many pamphlets being produced by GHQ India that were, in turn, used to formulate training within formations and then used in divisional, brigade and unit training instructions - thus a clear line of process can be seen not only from GHQ India down to brigade and battalion level, but also upwards from battalion and brigade level based on experience in battle that was absorbed into new training instructions. Together with the added impetus for education in the army, by 1945 the Indian Army had become a modern, professional and national army.

This is a fascinating new insight into the British army and its evolution through both large and small scale conflicts. To prepare for future wars, armies derive lessons from past wars. However, some armies are defeated because they learnt the wrong lessons, fighting new conflicts in ways appropriate to the last. For the British Army in the twentieth century, the challenge has been particularly great. It has never had the luxury of emerging from one major European war with the time to prepare itself for the next. The leading military historians show how ongoing commitments to a range of ‘small wars’ have always been part of the Army’s experience. After 1902 and after 1918 they included colonial campaigns, but they also developed into what we would now call counter-insurgency operations, and these became the norm between 1945 and 1969. During the height of the Cold War, in 1982, the Army was deployed to the Falklands. Since 1990 the dominant tasks of the Army have been peace support operations. This is an excellent resource for all students and scholars of military history, politics and international relations and British history.

The sheer size and influence of the British Indian Army, and its major role in the Allied War effort between 1939 and 1945 on behalf of a country from which it was seeking independence, maintains its fascination as a subject for a wide variety of historians. This volume presents a range of papers examining the Indian Army experience from the outbreak of world war in 1939 to the partition of India in 1947. With contributions from many of those at the forefront of the study of the Indian Army and Commonwealth history, the book focuses upon a period of Indian Army history not well covered by modern scholarship. As such it makes a substantial contribution across a range of subject areas, presenting a compendium of chapters examining Indian Army participation in the Second World War from North Africa to Burma, plus a variety of other topics including the evolution of wartime training, frontier operations, Churchill and the Indian Army, the Army's role in the development of post-war British counterinsurgency practice, and of particular note, several chapters examining aspects of the partition in 1947. As such, the book offers a fascinating insight into one of the most important yet least understood military forces of the twentieth century. It will be of interest not only to those seeking a fuller understanding of past campaigns, but also to those wishing to better understand the development and ethos of the present day military forces of the Indian subcontinent.

The historian and author of The Army in British India analyzes the British Indian Army’s devastating loss to the Imperial Japanese during WWII. The defeat of 90,000 Commonwealth soldiers by 50,000 Japanese soldiers made the World War II Battle for Malaya an important encounter for both political and military reasons. British military prestige was shattered, fanning the fires of nationalism in Asia, especially in India. Japan’s successful tactics in Malaya—rapid marches, wide outflanking movement along difficult terrain, nocturnal attacks, and roadblocks—would be repeated in Burma in 1942–43. Until the Allied command evolved adequate countermeasures, Japanese soldiers remained supreme in the field. Looking beyond the failures of command, Kaushik Roy focuses on tactics of the ground battle that unfolded in Malaya between December 1941 and February 1942. His analysis includes the organization of the Indian Army—the largest portion of Commonwealth troops—and compares it to the British and Australian armies that fought side by side with Indian soldiers. Utilizing both official war office records and personal memoirs, autobiographies, and oral histories, Roy presents a comprehensive narrative of operations interwoven with tactical analysis of the Battle for Malaya.