This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the relationship between the army and politicians as well as Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It should not be considered simply as a retrospective account of what was; it forms at least part of the context for what will be in the future.

Den sovjetiske marsjal Solokovskis værki amerikansk oversættelse om sovjetisk (marxistisk) militærstrategi. (Vasilii Danilovich Solokovski staves skiftevis som her eller med to i'er eller med y.

Soviet Military Strategy in Europe focuses on the development, form and content, implications for international relations, and goal of Soviet military plan in Europe. The book first discusses the foundation of Soviet military thought and revolution in Soviet military affairs, including basic concepts of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Soviet study of military affairs, nuclear revolution, and scientific and technical revolution. The publication also concentrates on Soviet study of laws and principles of military art and forces and primary operational concepts. Topics include laws of the first order, naval and air operations, nuclear strike, and conventional war considerations. The manuscript ponders on command and control, as well as combat modeling, survivability, coordination, centralization, and attack of NATO command and control. The book also reviews the issues of Soviet military strategy toward Europe and special Soviet problems. Topics include role of nuclear weapons, chemical warfare options, escalation to intercontinental war, NATO nuclear threat, nuclear weapon stockpile, and superiority and war initiation. The publication is a dependable reference for readers interested in the Soviet military scheme in Europe.

During the Cold War, Westerners were obsessed with the military policies of the Soviet Union. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, however, few details of Moscow's thinking on military matters were available. In this book, Andrei Kokoshin reveals how Soviet military theorists developed and debated the concepts that provided the basis for the Kremlin's defense policies. Drawing on Soviet-era archives and unpublished materials, he sheds light on this important chapter in the history of Russia and the world.The book covers three main themes: the relationship between politics and military strategy in the Soviet Union; how the Soviet political and military leadership assessed threats to Soviet security, the nature of future wars, and methods of warfare; and the relationship between offense and defense in Soviet military strategy. Kokoshin places the strategic concepts behind Moscow's military policies in the context of internal and international struggles for power, and assesses the future role of military power in Russia's national security strategy.

This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.

No other nation has invested as much intellectual capital in the study of war as has the Soviet Union over the last six decades, and the doctrine, strategy, and tactics that have been developed by Soviet theoreticians are bound to guide any future Soviet military action. The Soviet Art of War makes available to Western readers selections from the most significant and influential Soviet military writings from 1917 to the present. The Scotts have examined thousands of Soviet military publications, including the restricted journal of the Soviet General Staff, Voyennaya Mysl', to make this book the most comprehensive account of Soviet military theory and practice yet published. The papers they have chosen thoroughly illustrate the development of the basic features of Soviet military art, from the days of trench warfare to the era of the nuclear battlefield. These documents demonstrate the emphasis on surprise, on deception, on mass deep penetration of enemy defenses, and on a unified strategy for all services. They also show the forms of military action—destruction and attrition, defense and offense, maneuver and position-as seen through the eyes of leading Soviet marshals, generals, and admirals. The usefulness of this material is further enhanced by the Scotts' commentary and their analysis of each group of readings.