During the Cold War, Westerners were obsessed with the military policies of the Soviet Union. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, however, few details of Moscow's thinking on military matters were available. In this book, Andrei Kokoshin reveals how Soviet military theorists developed and debated the concepts that provided the basis for the Kremlin's defense policies. Drawing on Soviet-era archives and unpublished materials, he sheds light on this important chapter in the history of Russia and the world.The book covers three main themes: the relationship between politics and military strategy in the Soviet Union; how the Soviet political and military leadership assessed threats to Soviet security, the nature of future wars, and methods of warfare; and the relationship between offense and defense in Soviet military strategy. Kokoshin places the strategic concepts behind Moscow's military policies in the context of internal and international struggles for power, and assesses the future role of military power in Russia's national security strategy.

A comprehensive, chronological, and gripping account of how nuclear policy has shaped world history.

Drawing upon Soviet sources, this book assesses the evolving organization, uniforms, insignia, weaponry and personal equipment of Soviet naval infantry units from 1917 to 1991. Featuring eight plates of specially commissioned artwork alongside carefully chosen archive photographs, this study charts the history and appearance of the Soviet Union's naval infantry, from the October Revolution to the end of the Soviet era. Although Russian naval infantry achieved fame during the October Revolution they were quickly disbanded, only being re-established in 1939. Following the Axis invasion of 1941 some 500,000 Soviet Navy personnel served on land, fighting in the defence of Leningrad, Odessa and Sevastopol and the recapture of the Crimea in 1943–44; Soviet naval troops also participated in the invasion of Manchuria in 1945. During the Cold War era the Soviet Union developed an amphibious assault capability that had a vital strategic role – to capture an aggressor's geographical exits to the oceans and thereby forestall threats to Soviet submarine bases. Naval infantry forces could deploy a wealth of firepower assets, while the use of amphibious ships, hovercraft and helicopters aided their rapid deployment, even amid ice-bound terrain in the Arctic. All of these developments are described and illustrated in absorbing detail in this study.

This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea. Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyzes the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyzes in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control – avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world’s navies are currently of small or medium-size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy. This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history.

This work examines the CFE Treaty as a factor in Russia’s foreign and security policy. Moscow showed amazing persistence in their relationship with the "cornerstone of European security." Their approach to the treaty was a genuine attempt to shape the security environment in Europe and the former USSR. The treaty also enabled the dismantling of large conventional forces as they returned from Eastern Europe and transitioned into the armies of the newly independent states of the former USSR. The CFE Treaty, though, proved ineffective at constraining the enlargement of NATO. Simultaneously, Moscow’s foreign and security policy evolved from one that focused on the domestic development of the country to that of a more confident state reasserting itself as a great power. Drawing extensively on primary sources and analyses by Russian authors, this book employs two historical narratives, case studies, and a conceptual framework to show that while Moscow remained engaged with the CFE Treaty, undesired effects on Russia’s national interests gradually accrued at the expense of desired ones, leading Vladimir Putin to withdraw Russia from the treaty as an act of de-coupling from the "collective West." This book is relevant to scholars and policymakers who want to understand Russia’s approach to arms control as an element of military security.

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the tradition of non-use, a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states—thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user. The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

This book examines the viability of non-provocative defence - the controversial idea that defensive military policies and practices reduce the risk of wars and provide a viable basis for defending a society should war break out. Drawing on case studies from Europe, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Asia-Pacific, the author concludes that non-provocative defence concepts remain relevant and that they can help in deterring, conducting, and settling wars.