Paddock also includes new sections on American psychological warfare in the Pacific, the Army Rangers, the 1st Special Service Force, and American-led guerrillas in the Philippines."--BOOK JACKET.

Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952, the year the Armys special warfare center was established. While the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent U. S. experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many army leaders, trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psychological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Armys wartime arsenal, but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Armys adoption of unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a single operation the techniques of both types of warfare. Colonel Paddocks extensively documented work traces a portion of a brief episode in our Nations military hisotyr, but an instructive one. For the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the subsequent evolution of the Armys special warefare capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change. John S. Pustay Lieutenant General, United States Air Force President, National Defense University

In the year 2002, the U.S. Army Special Forces will celebrate a half-century of exemplary service. This illustrated look at the training and work of the U.S. Army Special Forces as it is today includes a brief history of these fighting elite followed by an up-close look at the advanced weaponry, high-tech gadgetry and fear-inspiring vehicles and aircraft at their disposal. Also discussed are special functions and duties like sniping, military free-fall, SCUBA and linguistic and cultural training. Color photographs of U.S. Army Special forces in training and in the field, are accompanied by appendices detailing their service history and the specifications of their specialized weaponry and equipment.

Scope. a. USSOCOM’s principle function is to prepare SOF to carry out assigned missions. This responsibility is derived from US Code Title 10, Section 167. In addition to organizing, training, and equipping SOF for unique missions, medical education is fundamental to fulfilling this law. Title 10 explicit responsibilities include development of strategy, doctrine, tactics, conducting specialized courses of medical instruction for commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and monitoring the medical education and professional certification of officers and enlisted personnel. USSOCOM’s medical education and certification responsibilities are inherent responsibilities of developing strategy, doctrine and tactics. b. The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) has the service- like responsibility of providing joint training and education venues that specialize in the art and science of joint Special Operations and its medical support. These efforts complete the education and training picture within the Department of Defense (DOD). While each of the Services, and the joint community, provide education and training to fill a particular niche (i.e., naval warfare, air warfare, joint warfare, etc.) the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center (JSOMTC) within USSOCOM and the Air Force’s Pararescue (PJ) course provides training to fill the medical niche of joint SOF core task requirements. SOF medical training and certification is force-wide, designed to initiate, maintain, and/or enhance medical skills of those SOF medics and non-medics who are required to perform the unique, global, multi- discipline mission of USSOCOM. Within the parameters of this directive, as outlined by first reference (Glossary Section III), USSOCOM’s primary responsibility is the medical education and training and certification of SOF. A secondary responsibility is the training and education of select DOD, interagency, and international military personnel in the requirements, capabilities, and limitation(s) of joint special operations organizations. Fostering a mutual understanding ensures the proper application of SOF and the enhancement of joint, combined and interagency medical operations. General. In support of the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), Special Operations medical personnel often find themselves providing care for both trauma and non-traumatic medical emergencies, beyond the Forward Edge of the Battlefield Area/Forward Line Of Troops, often in non-linear environments that may be far forward of any supporting medical infrastructure. This directive identifies the authority, mission, command relationships, functions, and responsibilities of the United States Special Operations Command as directed under Section 167, Title 10 of US Code to provide SOF medics with the required skill sets. In order to define and administer this SOF Medical skill set, USSOCOM has established a SOF Emergency Medical Services (EMS) State that is administered by the Command Surgeon. Medics who successfully complete the required academic requirements as defined within this directive will thus be known as SOF Advanced Tactical Practitioners (ATP).

This eBook edition of "Weapon of Choice: The Operations of U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan" has been formatted to the highest digital standards and adjusted for readability on all devices. "Weapon of Choice" presents a history of the U.S. Army special operations forces in Afghanistan from 11 September 2001 to 15 May 2002, during America's global war on terrorism. The purpose of the book is not to resolve Army special operations doctrinal issues, to clarify or update military definitions, or to be the "definitive" history of the continuing unconventional war in Afghanistan. The purpose is to demonstrate how the war to drive the Taliban from power, help Afghan people, and assist the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) rebuild the country afterward was successfully accomplished by majors, captains, warrant officers, and sergeants on tactical teams and aircrews at the lowest levels. Contents: Prelude to Terror Awakening the Giant "Subdue Without Fighting" Developing the SOF Campaign Top Draft Choices Committed to Middle East Exercises Civil Affairs to Islamabad, Pakistan Site Coordination With the Uzbeks at Karshi Kanabad Uncorking the Bottled Airlift Toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, 19 October-7 December 2001 Jumping Into the Dark Showing American Power "Look, We Have to Get the Special Forces Teams Into Afghanistan!" On Horseback With Dostum A "Bump" and Missiles in the Abyss 500 Afghans Can Die, But Not One American Can Be Injured Al-Qaeda Uprising—Qala-i-Jangi The Karzai Way to Kandahar The Campaign in Transition, 8 December 2001-28 February 2002 Old Glory Flies Again in Kabul Taking Down al-Qaeda at the Mir Wais Hospital Politics, War, and Rapport End of Mission—Aerial Resupply in Afghanistan The New War Entering the Valley D-Day ANACONDA From the Viewpoint of Force Multipliers "Good Morrrrning, Afghannnnistan" Driving the Taliban From Power Transition and Combat Operations

This work argues for a shift in expectations for "unconventional warfare" with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress.

In 1957 58 Vietnamese soldiers were given military training by Special Forces troops. Ten years later green berets were assisting over 40,000 paramilitary troops, along with another 40,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces soldiers. This monograph traces the development and notes the progress, problems, successes, and failures of a unique program undertaken by the U.S. Army for the first time in its history. With the withdrawal of the Special Forces from Vietnam in 1971, the Army could lay unique claim to the employment of a paramilitary force in sustained combat against a determined enemy. About the author: In 1960, Col. Kelly chaired the committee which produced the U.S. Army's first definitive approach to counterinsurgency, "The Role of the U.S. Army in the Cold War." For two years he commanded the 1st SFG, which provided multiple teams for combat in Vietnam. From 6/66 to 6/67, he commanded the 5th SFG in Vietnam. He led the Combat Development Command, Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations.