First published in 2005. This book studies the often overlooked work of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logio-Philosophicus, the Tractatus and their later work being argued as being mutually illuminating. Bogen states that the works of Wittgenstein require a study of their points of contact which led to the formation of this title. This is accomplished by studying the text in two parts: its relevance to picture theory, the subsequent abandonment of the picture theory.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book defends and outlines the key issues surrounding the philosophy of content as demonstrated in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. The text shows how Wittgenstein's critical arguments concerning mind and meaning are destructive of much recent work in the philosophy of thought and language, including the representationalist orthodoxy. These issues are related to the work of Davidson, Rorty and McDowell among others.

Language, Reality, and Transcendence deals with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein by delving into language, grammar, rule, self, world, culture, and value. Wittgenstein has given a comprehensive philosophy of man and the world and has dealt with the destiny of man by outlining the moral and the spiritual goals of human life. In this work, the nature of Wittgenstein's transcendent metaphysics of man and the ultimate reality has been outlined.

This book engages with the later arguments of this major philosopher to examine his significant impact on our understanding of language.

This title was first published in 2000: What was Wittgenstein's relation to "theory of meaning" in his post-1937 writings and what was his characterization of "philosophy" ? How does "philosophy" in Wittgenstein's later writings differ from what is usually accepted in modern academic 'analytic' philosophy? This book discusses problems encountered in looking at Wittgenstein's texts after-1937, focusing particularly on whether the problem of philosophy amounts to a systematic or a theoretical activity. Arguing that philosophy can be characterized as a form of conceptual investigation, Gefwert aims to demonstrate that a theoretical view does not correspond to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. For example, philosophy is not transcendental as he thought it was before 1929. Neither is philosophical language universal as Wittgenstein 1929-1936 thought it was. Proposing that a philosophical conceptual investigation is analogous to a psychotherapeutical session of Freud, with the common aim to dissolve the conceptual problems in language that haunt us in our everyday life, Gefwert's examination of the post-1937 writings of Wittgenstein concludes that "philosophical investigation" is a very different activity than that assumed by the Logical Positives and others adhering to a theoretical view.

The book focuses on how Wittgenstein and Gadamer treat language in their accounts of language as game and their major writings on the subject - Philosophical Investigations and Truth and Method, respectively. Chris Lawn goes on to offer a critique of Wittgenstein's account of linguistic rules, drawing upon Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, particularly his emphasis upon tradition, temporality, historicality and novelty. The text demonstrates how paying attention to such elements - excluded by Wittgenstein's conception of rules - in fact strengthens Wittgenstein's position from a hermeneutical perspective. Finally, Wittgenstein and Gadamer investigates the possibility of connection between Wittgenstein's focus upon lexical particularity and Gadamer's greater concern for the universal and the general. A groundbreaking work of post-analytic philosophy, Wittgenstein and Gadamer brings the work of two major modern philosophers in to dialogue. It is required reading for anyone studying or researching the work of either philosopher, or the philosophy of language more generally.

One of the first things to strike the reader of Wittgenstein's writings is the unique power of his style. One immediately notices the intriguing and arrangement of the paragraphs in Philosophical Investi composition gations, or the stark assertiveness of the sentences in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. A sense of the singular style being employed is unavoidable, even before the reader understands anything of what is happening philos ophically. Perhaps precisely for this reason it is too often assumed that coming to understand either work has little or nothing to do with re sponding to its form. The unusual style is a mere curiousity decorating the vehicle of Wittgenstein's ideas. Form is assigned a purely incidental import, there is a coincidence of this or that rhetorical flair with the yet to be determined content of the thoughts. The remarkableness of the style is perhaps registered in a tidy obiter dictum standing beside the more arduous task of discovering the substance of the ideas being presented. our interest, or at Wittgenstein's peculiar way of writing ably captures least our attention, but it bears only minor philosophical import. Though not unprecedented as a form of philosophical composition, it does not conform to the currently acceptable conventions; hence Wittgenstein's style is often thought to stand in the way of understanding his meaning. Such assumptions can be harmless for certain types of writing; however it does not appear as though Wittgenstein's is one of these.