First published in 2005. This book studies the often overlooked work of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logio-Philosophicus, the Tractatus and their later work being argued as being mutually illuminating. Bogen states that the works of Wittgenstein require a study of their points of contact which led to the formation of this title. This is accomplished by studying the text in two parts: its relevance to picture theory, the subsequent abandonment of the picture theory.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book defends and outlines the key issues surrounding the philosophy of content as demonstrated in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. The text shows how Wittgenstein's critical arguments concerning mind and meaning are destructive of much recent work in the philosophy of thought and language, including the representationalist orthodoxy. These issues are related to the work of Davidson, Rorty and McDowell among others.

One of the first things to strike the reader of Wittgenstein's writings is the unique power of his style. One immediately notices the intriguing and arrangement of the paragraphs in Philosophical Investi composition gations, or the stark assertiveness of the sentences in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. A sense of the singular style being employed is unavoidable, even before the reader understands anything of what is happening philos ophically. Perhaps precisely for this reason it is too often assumed that coming to understand either work has little or nothing to do with re sponding to its form. The unusual style is a mere curiousity decorating the vehicle of Wittgenstein's ideas. Form is assigned a purely incidental import, there is a coincidence of this or that rhetorical flair with the yet to be determined content of the thoughts. The remarkableness of the style is perhaps registered in a tidy obiter dictum standing beside the more arduous task of discovering the substance of the ideas being presented. our interest, or at Wittgenstein's peculiar way of writing ably captures least our attention, but it bears only minor philosophical import. Though not unprecedented as a form of philosophical composition, it does not conform to the currently acceptable conventions; hence Wittgenstein's style is often thought to stand in the way of understanding his meaning. Such assumptions can be harmless for certain types of writing; however it does not appear as though Wittgenstein's is one of these.

This title was first published in 2000: What was Wittgenstein's relation to "theory of meaning" in his post-1937 writings and what was his characterization of "philosophy" ? How does "philosophy" in Wittgenstein's later writings differ from what is usually accepted in modern academic 'analytic' philosophy? This book discusses problems encountered in looking at Wittgenstein's texts after-1937, focusing particularly on whether the problem of philosophy amounts to a systematic or a theoretical activity. Arguing that philosophy can be characterized as a form of conceptual investigation, Gefwert aims to demonstrate that a theoretical view does not correspond to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. For example, philosophy is not transcendental as he thought it was before 1929. Neither is philosophical language universal as Wittgenstein 1929-1936 thought it was. Proposing that a philosophical conceptual investigation is analogous to a psychotherapeutical session of Freud, with the common aim to dissolve the conceptual problems in language that haunt us in our everyday life, Gefwert's examination of the post-1937 writings of Wittgenstein concludes that "philosophical investigation" is a very different activity than that assumed by the Logical Positives and others adhering to a theoretical view.

“The more narrowly we examine language, the sharper becomes the con?ict - tween it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation; it was a requirement. ) The con?ict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. —We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk; so we need 1 friction. Back to the rough ground!” —Ludwig Wittgenstein This manuscript consists of four related parts: a brief overview of Wittgenstein’s p- losophy of language and its relevance to information systems; a detailed explanation of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy of language and mind; an extended discussion of the re- vance of his philosophy to understanding some of the problems inherent in information systems, especially those systems which rely on retrieval based on some representation of the intellectual content of that information. And, fourthly, a series of detailed footnotes which cite the sources of the numerous quotations and provide some discussion of the related issues that the text inspires. The ?rst three of these parts can each be read by itself with some pro?t, although they are related and do form a conceptual whole.

No detailed description available for "Language and Being in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations"".

This book engages with the later arguments of this major philosopher to examine his significant impact on our understanding of language.