Contains a collection of 34 declassified National Intelligence Estimates and memoranda representing the United States Intelligence Community's most authoritative analysis of Yugoslavia, spanning four decades from the 1948 break with the Soviet Union until 1990 and the eve of the nation's collapse.

Defying Stalin and his brand of communism, Tito's Yugoslavia developed a unique kind of socialism that combined one-party rule with an economic system of workers' self-management that aroused intense interest throughout the cold war. As a member of the American Universities Field Staff, Dennison Rusinow became a long-time resident and frequent visitor to Yugoslavia during these transformative times. This volume presents the most significant of his refreshingly immediate and well-informed reports on life in Yugoslavia and the country's major political developments. Rusinow's essays explore such diverse topics as the first American-style supermarket and its challenge to traditional outdoor markets; the lessons of a Serbian holiday feast (Slava); the resignation of Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic; the Croatian political purge of 1971; ethnic divides and the rise of nationalism throughout the country; the tension between conservative and liberal forces in Yugoslav politics; and the student revolt at Belgrade University in 1968. Rusinow's final report from 1991 examines the serious challenges to the nation's future even as it collapsed.

This book, the first of two volumes, challenges decades of superficial and selective rhetoric about Tito’s Yugoslavia. The essays explore some of the gaps in the existing descriptions of the country that have existed for decades. Contributors cover a range of topics including the abolition of the multi-party system, nonalignment, and the 1968 reinforcing position among others.

Thank you for picking up my book. I am Borko B. Djordjevic, M.D., Ph.D., a plastic surgeon, and an American and Serbian Patriot. This manuscript is my political memoirs, more precisely my perspective from an American viewpoint and from the aspect of Serbian reality. We will examine the crucial events at the end of the 20th Century, in which a vital role was played by the Serbian archon Milosevic in the destruction of Serbia. My desire is to unveil the truth of who is responsible for the suffering of the Serbian people and what the consequences are of the defeat in the war for freedom, national identity, and dignity for the Serbs. I am one of the few people who were in a position of trust that can convey this message to the world. I hope you find the book worthy of your time.

A new approach to ideas about war, from one of the UK's leading strategic thinkers In 1912 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote a short story about a war fought from underwater submersibles that included the sinking of passenger ships. It was dismissed by the British admirals of the day, not on the basis of technical feasibility, but because sinking civilian ships was not something that any civilised nation would do. The reality of war often contradicts expectations, less because of some fantastic technical or engineering dimension, but more because of some human, political, or moral threshold that we had never imagined would be crossed. As Lawrence Freedman shows, ideas about the causes of war and strategies for its conduct have rich and varied histories which shape predictions about the future. Freedman shows how looking at how the future of war was conceived about in the past (and why this was more often than not wrong) can put into perspective current thinking about future conflicts. The Future of War - which takes us from preparations for the world wars, through the nuclear age and the civil wars which became the focus for debate after the end of the Cold War, to present preoccupations with hybrid and cyber warfare - is filled with fascinating insights from one of the most brilliant military and strategic historians of his generation.

"Featuring new evidence on: Mao, Stalin, and the road to the 1950 Summit; The 1954 Geneva Conference; Sino-Albanian summits 1961-67; Mongolia and the Cold War; North Korea in 1956; Romania and the Sino-US opening."--Cover

After the heads of state and government of almost all European countries, the USA, and Canada signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki on August 1st, 1975, little was heard about the CSCE process. However, far away from the headline-grabbing meetings between the leading politicians of the USA and the USSR as well as the Geneva negotiations on disarmament, the Helsinki process proved to be an efficient framework for the East-West negotiations. The inconclusive Belgrade CSCE Meeting of 1977-1978 - after six months the delegations were only able to agree on a brief final document - was nevertheless a significant milestone for the CSCE process itself: negotiation rules were drawn up, interpreted, negotiated and re-negotiated. The contributions to this volume offer solid insights into the follow-up meeting in Belgrade in 1977/78, the Cold War, and in particular the CSCE process.