Epistemic injustice was conceptualized by Fricker as a form of social injustice, which occurs when people’s authority ‘as a knower’ is ignored, dismissed, or marginalized. It is attracting increasing interest in the mental health field because of the asymmetries of power between people using mental health services and mental health professionals. People experiencing mental health distress are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice as a consequence of deeply embedded social stigma, negative stereotyping, and assumed irrationality. This is amplified by other forms of stereotyping or structural discrimination, including racism, misogyny, and homophobia. Consequently, individual testimonies may be discounted as both irrational and unreliable. Epistemic injustice also operates systemically reflecting social and demographic characteristics, such a race, gender, sexuality or disability, or age.

This outstanding reference source to epistemic injustice is the first collection of its kind. Over thirty chapters address topics such as testimonial and hermeneutic injustice and virtue epistemology, objectivity and objectification, implicit bias, gender and race.

This is a vital resource for anyone looking to better support people with psychosis and serious mental illnesses.

Provides practical solutions for ending coercion in mental health care and realizing the universal right to legal capacity.

This volume considers forms of information manipulation and restriction in contemporary society. It explores whether and when manipulation of the conditions of inquiry without the consent of those manipulated is morally or epistemically justified. The contributors provide a wealth of examples of manipulation, and debate whether epistemic paternalism is distinct from other forms of paternalism debated in political theory. Special attention is given to medical practice, for science communication, and for research in science, technology, and society. Some of the contributors argue that unconsenting interference with people’s ability of inquire is consistent with, and others that it is inconsistent with, efforts to democratize knowledge and decision-making. These differences invite theoretical reflection regarding which goods are fundamental, whether there is a clear or only a moving boundary between informing and instructing, and whether manipulation of people’s epistemic conditions amounts to a type of intellectual injustice. The collection pays special attention to contemporary paternalistic practices in big data and scientific research, as the way in which the flow of information or knowledge might be curtailed by the manipulations of a small body of experts or algorithms.

This textbook provides a detailed resource introducing the subdiscipline of mental health informatics. It systematically reviews the methods, paradigms, tools and knowledge base in both clinical and bioinformatics and across the spectrum from research to clinical care. Key foundational technologies, such as terminologies, ontologies and data exchange standards are presented and given context within the complex landscape of mental health conditions, research and care. The learning health system model is utilized to emphasize the bi-directional nature of the translational science associated with mental health processes. Descriptions of the data, technologies, paradigms and products that are generated by and used in each process and their limitations are discussed. Mental Health Informatics: Enabling a Learning Mental Healthcare System is a comprehensive introductory resource for students, educators and researchers in mental health informatics and related behavioral sciences. It is an ideal resource for use in a survey course for both pre- and post-doctoral training programs, as well as for healthcare administrators, funding entities, vendors and product developers working to make mental healthcare more evidence-based.

Prejudice influences people’s thoughts and behaviors in many ways; it can lead people to underestimate others’ credibility, to read anger or hysteria into their words, or to expect knowledge and truth to ‘sound’ a certain way—or to come from a certain type of person. These biases and mistakes can have a big effect on everything from an institutional culture to an individual’s self-understanding. These kinds of intellectual harms are known as epistemic injustice. Most people are opposed to unfair prejudices (at least in principle), and no one wants to make avoidable mistakes. But research in the social sciences reveals a disturbing truth: Even people who intend to be fair-minded and unprejudiced are influenced by unconscious biases and stereotypes. We may sincerely want to be epistemically just, but we frequently fail, and simply thinking harder about it will not fix the problem. The essays collected in this volume draw from cutting-edge social science research and detailed case studies, to suggest how we can better tackle our unconscious reactions and institutional biases, to help ameliorate epistemic injustice. The volume concludes with an afterward by Miranda Fricker, who catalyzed recent scholarship on epistemic injustice, reflecting on these new lines of research and potential future directions to explore.

Since the late 1970s, there has been an increase in the study of diversity, inclusion, race, and ethnicity within the field of counseling. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Multicultural Counseling, Social Justice, and Advocacy will comprehensively synthesize a wide range of terms, concepts, ideologies, groups, and organizations through a diverse lens. This encyclopedia will include entries on a wide range of topics relative to multicultural counseling, social justice and advocacy, and the experiences of diverse groups. The encyclopedia will consist of approximately 600 signed entries, arranged alphabetically within four volumes.