Offering a unique and original perspective on Britain's 'Small Wars' leadership culture - this title is an essential reading for serving soldiers and scholars of military studies. It is based on original archival research. It offers fascinating survey of counterinsurgency operations - with relevance for today's military and security. Between 1948 and 1960, the British army conducted three important counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. During that time, military leaders inspired the evolution of a distinct organisational culture, known as 'small wars culture', which affected learning, discipline and attitudes towards leadership and fellow soldiers. Using a synthesis of organisational theory and archival research, this book explores how military leaders embedded and transmitted this particular military organisational culture within the British army and provides an analysis of leaders' characteristics, their support networks and past experiences. This book will be of interest to counterinsurgency specialists, the British Army and military historians and sociologists, as well as to serving military forces.

"Offering a unique and original perspective on Britain's 'Small Wars' leadership culture - this title is an essential reading for serving soldiers and scholars of military studies. It is based on original archival research. It offers fascinating survey of counterinsurgency operations - with relevance for today's military and security. Between 1948 and 1960, the British army conducted three important counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. During that time, military leaders inspired the evolution of a distinct organisational culture, known as 'small wars culture', which affected learning, discipline and attitudes towards leadership and fellow soldiers. Using a synthesis of organisational theory and archival research, this book explores how military leaders embedded and transmitted this particular military organisational culture within the British army and provides an analysis of leaders' characteristics, their support networks and past experiences. This book will be of interest to counterinsurgency specialists, the British Army and military historians and sociologists, as well as to serving military forces."--Bloomsbury publishing.

This book analyses the various ways counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is gendered. The book examines the US led war in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards, including the invasion, the population-centric counterinsurgency operations and the efforts to train a new Afghan military charged with securing the country when the US and NATO withdrew their combat forces in 2014. Through an analysis of key counterinsurgency texts and military memoirs, the book explores how gender and counterinsurgency are co-constitutive in numerous ways. It discusses the multiple military masculinities that counterinsurgency relies on, the discourse of ‘cultural sensitivity’, and the deployment of Female Engagement Teams (FETs). Gendering Counterinsurgency demonstrates how population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine and practice can be captured within a gendered dynamic of ‘killing and caring’ – reliant on physical violence, albeit mediated through ‘armed social work’. This simultaneously contradictory and complementary dynamic cannot be understood without recognising how the legitimation and the practice of this war relied on multiple gendered embodied performances of masculinities and femininities. Developing the concept of ‘embodied performativity’ this book shows how the clues to understanding counterinsurgency, as well as gendering war more broadly are found in war’s everyday gendered manifestations. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency warfare, gender politics, governmentality, biopolitics, critical war studies, and critical security studies in general.

The once-neglected study of counter-insurgency operations has recently emerged as an area of central concern for Western governments and their military organizations. While counter-insurgency represents a hugely challenging form of contemporary warfare, there exists a considerable body of experience that offers assistance in the form of examples of

This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.

Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.

Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation.

This volume analyzes the conduct of the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) counter-insurgency operations during the two major Palestinian uprisings (1987-1993 and 2000-2005) in the Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It employs primary and secondary resources to produce a comprehensive analysis on whether or not the IDF has been able to adapt its conventional conduct of warfare to the realities of the Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict and achieve any sort of victory over the Palestinian insurgents. Sergio Catignani provides new insights into how conventional armies struggle with contemporary insurgency by looking in particular at the strategic, operational, tactical and ethical dilemmas of the IDF over the last two decades. By examining the way in which the IDF and the Israeli security doctrine were formed and developed over time, he explores the extent to which Israeli security assumptions, civil-military relations, the organizational culture, command and control structure, and conduct of the IDF have affected its adaptation to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian low-intensity conflict. Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas will be of much interest to students of low-intensity conflict and counter-insurgency, the Israeli army, the Middle Eastern conflict and strategic studies in general.