This report analyses the Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (published as HC 697, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780102946369). The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against its six Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, which run until the end of March 2008, has deteriorated since the previous year's Annual Report and Accounts. At the end of 2007, the MoD did not expect to meet the target relating to generating forces and expects "only partly" to meet targets relating to recruitment and retention, and defence equipment procurement. The failure to meet the target for generating forces is a consequence of the continuing high levels of deployment of the Armed Forces. The Committee is concerned that the Armed Forces have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years, and for every year since 2002. Achieving manning balance in all three Service continues to be a challenge. Shortages remain within many specialist trades in all three Armed Services, but especially in the Army Medical Service. The report notes the failure to meet harmony guidelines in the Army and the Royal Air Force - another indicator of the pressure on the Armed Forces from the continuing high level of operations - and another target missed by all three services is for ethnic minority recruitment. The MoD continues to experience substantial forecast cost increases on equipment programmes, and the report notes delays in delivering equipment programmes to the planned in-service dates. The MoD faces difficult choices in the face of expected cuts in the defence programme and the management of a streamlining exercise to reduce civilian posts in the headquarters.

This report examines the administration, expenditure, activities and achievements of the MoD during the 2008-09 financial year, as detailed in the Ministry of Defence annual report and accounts 2008-09 (ISBN 9780102962239). It continues a series of inquiries and, indeed, the Committee sees it as cause for concern that the NAO found the need to qualify the MoD's resource accounts for the third consecutive year. Whilst it is acknowledged that capability in theatre must be the Department's first concern, failing to maintain accurate and full information on personnel and to keep track of assets has the potential to threaten the long-term capability of the Department, including operational capability.

For the sixth successive year, the Ministry of Defence Accounts were qualified. The Qualifications covered non-compliance with international reporting standards on the treatment of some contracts; lack of audit evidence on the valuation of inventory (worth some £3 billion) and of capital spares (worth some £7 billion); and on the regularity of the Accounts because of the failure to obtain approval for the remuneration package of the Chief of Defence Materiel. The MoD was also five months late in submitting its audited accounts to Parliament. The National Audit Office had found errors in its sample examination of accruals and so the MoD decided to resolve these problems before submitting the accounts. The MoD said they did not have the necessary expertise to manage the financial complexity that featured in the implementation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review so sought assistance. The MoD should ensure its people have the right skills to deal with all financial problems so that they do not need to bring in expensive external accountants. There is also concern about the MoD's reluctance to estimate the full costs of its operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The NAO did not consider that the MoD has adequate information, especially with respect to recording the cost of its activities and outputs, to run its business effectively. The MoD should set out its commitment to improving its management information. It is also vital that defence spending remains at more than 2 per cent of GDP in line with the UK's NATO commitment.

This book explores the process by which defence policy is made in contemporary Britain and the institutions, actors and conflicting interests which interact in its inception and continuous reformulation. Rather than dealing with the substance of defence policy, this study focuses upon the institutional actors involved in this process. This is a subject which has commanded far more interest from public, Parliament, government and the armed forces since the protracted, bloody and ultimately unsuccessful British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The work begins with a discussion of two contextual factors shaping policy. The first relates to the impact of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over defence and intelligence matters, while the second considers the impact of Britain’s relatively disappointing economic performance upon the funding of British defence since 1945. It then goes on to explore the role and impact of all the key policy actors, from the Prime Minister, Cabinet and core executive, to the Ministry of Defence and its relations with the broader ‘Whitehall village’, and the Foreign Office and Treasury in particular. The work concludes by examining the increasing influence of external policy actors and forces, such as Parliament, the courts, political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of British defence policy, security studies, and contemporary military history.

Foreign policy has dominated successive governments' time in office and cast a consistently long shadow over British politics in the period since 1945. Robert Self provides a readable and incisive assessment of the key issues and events from the retreat from empire through the cold war period to Humanitarian Intervention and the debacle in Iraq.

In March 2008 the Government published "The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world" (NSS) (Cm. 7291, 2008, ISBN 9780101729123). Part dealt with the contribution of the armed forces to the overarching security policy of the UK, and the Defence Committee set out to examine "how the MoD and the Armed Forces interact with other departments and agencies to ensure the safety and security of the UK". The report looks at the developing area of Parliamentary scrutiny of national security, welcomes the proposed creation of a Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, but does question which minister will give evidence to that Committee. The vital role of the ministry of Defence is outlined, and the contribution must be appropriately understood, directed and resourced. The Committee recommends that the Government investigate how the Territorial Army could be used in civil emergencies, rather than always resorting to regular troops. It is essential that all activity relating to national security is appropriately funded from an indicative national security budget. The NSS should also make a clearer connection between the strategy and industry, and the Committee welcomes the Government's engagement with the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community. Current issues examined include: the London 2012 Olympic Games; maritime security - the Committee comments on only six Royal Navy ships being dedicated to this, and the level of action taken to address identified threats to aspects of critical infrastructure such as ports; the impact of current operations and the extent to which UK forces are stretched or overstretched.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is one of the largest landowners in the UK, with a total estate (including land and property) valued at around £18 billion. Defence Estates (an Agency of the MoD until April 2007 and now re-integrated as part of the MoD) has responsibility for managing the defence estate, with an annual budget of £1.15 billion. The Committee's report examines the work of Defence Estates, focusing on the standard of accommodation for Service personnel and their families. The report highlights concerns about sub-standard accommodation, particularly in relation to the operation of the regional prime contracts for single living accommodation and the maintenance of service families accommodation under the housing prime contract. It argues that the provision of good quality accommodation for Service personnel and their families, modern and efficient office accommodation, and a well-maintained training estate, play a vital role in contributing to the effectiveness of our Armed Forces, particularly important given the current high tempo of operations. Overall, the report finds that although Defence Estates is doing much good work, there are considerable challenges ahead. A substantial increase in investment in the defence estate is required and the MoD must resist the temptation to take from the estates budget when the defence budget is stretched.

This report recognises the efforts of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to improve the methods by which intelligence is collected, interpreted and then disseminated over the battlefield, where it can be used to best effect - a process known as ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance). However there are fears that plans for the development of ISTAR capability might be put to one side or slowed during the process of the Strategic Defence Review, due largely to financial constraints. The report warns that control of such a vital resource as ISTAR needs to be clarified to ensure proper coordination and development across the Services. The Committee has been impressed by the commitment within the MoD, the Armed Forces and within industry to improve detection of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as a priority, and to work creatively and co-operatively to that end. The technologies and techniques refined during the current campaign in Afghanistan must be mainstreamed into future UK ISTAR capability. However the theoretical expectations of what ISTAR can contribute to minimising civilian and UK military casualties must be kept in proportion. Realism about the nature of asymmetric warfare, and what ISTAR can contribute, is essential if current and future missions are to succeed.

Recruiting & retaining the right number of well-trained personnel is vital for the continuing success of the United Kingdom's Armed Forces. Yet recruitment and retention targets are not being met. There is particular concern about shortages in 'pinchpoint' trades - trades or areas of expertise where there is not enough trained strength to perform operational tasks without encroaching on the time provided between deployments for recuperation, training and leave. This report sets out to examine the factors which hamper recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces and reservists & identify what the MoD is doing to improve these. There is also concern and exmination of the issue of why ethnic minority personnel form such a low proportion of the Armed Forces.

The Defence Committee report recommends that when troops are committed to operations in future there must be robust plans to coordinate military and reconstruction efforts from the earliest stages. The next Government should lay out the requirements of the "Comprehensive Approach" (the combination of civilian and military actors in a counter-insurgency operation) in order better to preserve all the lessons learned in the complex operations of Iraq and Afghanistan, many of them having been painfully re-learned from Bosnia, Kosovo and even Malaya. The Committee looks to the recently formed Stabilisation Unit (owned by the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence) to maintain a capacity to deploy significant numbers of personnel for post-conflict reconstruction and to ensure that vital knowledge and skills gained during deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan are retained and built on. The Comprehensive Approach requires close work with local nationals to build up their capability and confidence in all fields including security, governance, law and order and development. This must include women at all levels. The Government needs to find better ways to draw on the expertise of NGOs without compromising the effectiveness and safety of aid workers on the ground.