Michael J. Loux here presents a fresh reading of two of the most important books of the Metaphysics, Books Z and H, in which Aristotle presents his mature theory of primary substances (ousiai). Focusing on the interplay of Aristotle's early and late views, Loux maintans that the later concept of ousia should be understood in terms of a theory of predication that carries interesting implications for contemporary metaphysics. Loux argues that in his first attempt in identifying ousiai in the Categories, Aristotle encountered a set of ontological problems which he wrestled with again in Metaphysics Z and H. In the Categories, where the primary realities are basic subjects of predication construed in essentialist terms as things falling under natural kinds, familiar particulars are the primary ousiai. In subsequent works, Aristotle holds that since familiar particulars come into being and pass away, they must be composites of matter and form; and in Metaphysics Z and H, he explores the implications of this insight for the search for ousia. Maintaining that the substantial forms of familiar particulars are the primary ousiai, the later Aristotle interprets forms as predicable universals rather than as particulars, each uniquely possessed by a single object.

This study offers a re-interpretation of basic elements of Aristotle's semantics and metaphysics (particularly his sublunar ontology) on the basis of a meticulous reconstruction of his semantics. By eliminating anachronistic conceptions commonly ascribed to him, many shortcomings or obscurities he is accused of will disappear.

The problem of the one and the many is central to ancient Greek philosophy, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to Aristotle's treatment of it in the Metaphysics. This omission is all the more surprising because the Metaphysics is one of our principal sources for thinking that the problem is central and for the views of other ancient philosophers on it.The Central Books of the Metaphysics are widely recognized as the most difficult portion of a most difficult work. Halper uses the problem of the one and the many as a lens through which to examine the Central Books. What he sees is an extraordinary degree of doctrinal cogency and argumentative coherence in a work that almost everyone else supposes to be some sort of patchwork. Rather than trying to elucidate Aristotle's doctrines-most of which have little explicitly to do with the problem, Halper holds that the problem of the one and the many, in various formulations, is the key problematic from which Aristotle begins and with which he constructs his arguments. Thus, exploring the problem of the one and the many turns out to be a way to reconstruct Aristotle's arguments in the Metaphysics. Armed with the arguments, Halper is able to see Aristotle's characteristic doctrines as conclusions. These latter are, for the most part, supported by showing that they resolve otherwise insoluble problems. Moreover, having Aristotle's arguments enables Halper to delimit those doctrines and to resolve the apparent contradiction in Aristotle's account of primary ousia, the classic problem of the Central Books. Although there is no way to make the Metaphysics easy, this very thorough treatment of the text succeeds in making it surprisingly intelligible.

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

This edited book explores languages and cultures (or linguacultures) from a translation perspective, resting on the assumption that they find expression as linguacultural worldviews. Specifically, it investigates how these worldviews emerge, how they are constructed, shaped and modified in and through translation, understood both as a process and a product. The book’s content progresses from general to specific: from the notions of worldview and translation, through a consideration of how worldviews are shaped in and through language, to a discussion of worldviews in translation, both in macro-scale and in specific details of language structure and use. The contributors to the volume are linguists, linguistic anthropologists, practising translators, and/or translation studies scholars, and the book will be of interest to scholars and students in any of these fields.

This volume gathers studies by prominent scholars and philosophers about the question how have major figures from the history of philosophy, and some contemporary philosophers, addressed "the ultimate why question": why is there anything at all rather than nothing whatsoever?

This study intends to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle is due to the persistent misinterpetation of key notions in his works, including anachronistic perceptions of statement making. In the first volume Aristotle's semantics is culled from the Organon. The second volume presents Aristotle's ontology of the sublunar world, and pays special attention to his strategy of argument in light of his semantic views. The reconstruction of the semantic models that come forward as genuinely Aristotelian can give a new impetus to the study of Aristotelian philosophic and semantic thought.

In this rich collection of philosophical writings, Stanley Rosen addresses a wide range of topics-from eros, poetry, and freedom to problems like negation and the epistemological status of sense perception. Though diverse in subject, Rosen’s essays share two unifying principles: there can be no legitimate separation of textual hermeneutics from philosophical analysis, and philosophical investigation must be oriented in terms of everyday language and experience, although it cannot simply remain within these confines. Ordinary experience provides a minimal criterion for the assessment of extraordinary discourses, Rosen argues, and without such a criterion we would have no basis for evaluating conflicting discourses: philosophy would give way to poetry.Philosophical problems are not so deeply embedded in a specific historical context that they cannot be restated in terms as valid for us today as they were for those who formulated them, the author maintains. Rosen shows that the history of philosophy-a story of conflicting interpretations of human life and the structure of intelligibility-is a story that comes to life only when it is rethought in terms of the philosophical problems of our own personal and historical situation.

Concerned with the meaning and function of principles in an era that appears to have given up on their possibility altogether, Christopher P. Long traces the paths of Aristotle's thinking concerning finite being from the Categories, through the Physics, to the Metaphysics, and ultimately into the Nicomachean Ethics. Long argues that a dynamic and open conception of principles emerges in these works that challenges the traditional tendency to seek security in permanent and eternal absolutes. He rethinks the meaning of Aristotle's notion of principle (arche) and spans the divide of analytic and continental methodological approaches to ancient Greek philosophy, while connecting Aristotle's thinking to that of Levinas, Gadamer, and Heidegger.

Presents 12,860 entries listing scholarly publications on Greek studies. Research and review journals, books, and monographs are indexed in the areas of classical, Hellenistic, Biblical, Byzantine, Medieval, and modern Greek studies., but no annotations are included. After the general listings, entries are also indexed by journal, text, name, geography, and subject. The CD-ROM contains an electronic version of the book. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR