North Korea’s economic and security policies imperil both itself and its neighbours. The economy has been contracting for almost a decade, and the regime appears unwilling or unable to arrest the decline. Instead, Pyongyang has resorted to begging for international aid. This approach alone cannot work: fundamental reform is needed; without it, the regime cannot survive. In the meantime, the North’s problems will be destabilising for the region. Pyongyang has secured short-term international humanitarian assistance, but in the long term the South is its best hope for investment and economic help. Despite Pyongyang’s defensive approach to the South, limited commercial arrangements are in place, and may moderate the North’s policies and help to ease the unpredictable consequences of Pyongyang’s collapse. Pyongyang has tried to improve relations with the US in a bid to ease economic sanctions and attract investment. However, the nuclear deal reached with the US in October 1994 – under which the North agreed to give up its ambiguous nuclear programme – is in difficulties. In this paper, David Reese argues that, despite these problems, the North’s neighbours must persevere with engagement policies. At the same time, South Korea and the US must maintain their security posture on the Peninsula. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s attempts to establish commercial links with the North need time and patience, and should not be derailed by relatively minor incidents. Both Seoul and Washington must ensure that they coordinate their policies to prevent the North from playing one off against the other. Selectively easing sanctions on a case-by-case basis could allow the North to earn desperately needed hard currency. Although it is difficult for Washington and Seoul to maintain political support for engagement, both should make further efforts to draw the North into making significant policy changes. The US and South Korea should ensure that they involve the interested regional parties in efforts to draw the North into the international community. China has a key role to play in developments on the Peninsula. Both Seoul and Washington should therefore ensure that they work closely with Beijing. While historical sensitivities make it difficult for Japan to play a leading role, Tokyo would be central to the North’s economic recovery, and must not be marginalised. Russia also has a contribution to make to the broader security guarantees which could develop from accommodation between North and South. Ultimately, the course of events on the Peninsula will depend primarily on the North. Pyongyang shows little sign of being prepared to engage constructively with the US and South Korea. As its economy deteriorates, its options will narrow further. Until domestic forces in North Korea shift, the US and its allies should expect a protracted phase of desultory and sometimes destabilising diplomatic manoeuvres by Pyongyang.

Featuring contributions by some of the leading experts in Korean studies, this book examines the political content of Kim Jong-Il's regime maintenance, including both the domestic strategy for regime survival and North Korea's foreign relations with South Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. It considers how and why the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) became a "hermit kingdom" in the name of Juche (self-reliance) ideology, and the potential for the barriers of isolationism to endure. This up-to-date analysis of the DPRK's domestic and external policy linkages also includes a discussion of the ongoing North Korean nuclear standoff in the region.

In recent years, North Korea has been plagued by economic decline, famine, and international isolation. Due to the current situation in North Korea, there has been recent speculation about the future of North Korea. Some feel that it will collapse, others hypothesize that North Korea will gradually reform and open itself to the outside world. The 'hard landing' and 'soft landing' scenarios for North Korea future are discussed, and the argument for a North Korean 'soft landing' is made in this thesis, based on recent diplomatic events, and internal changes in North Korea. Regardless of the future of North Korea, each scenario carries with it certain implications and essential tasks for the United States Army in Korea. These implications and tasks are explored, and recommendations for detailing with the future of North Korea are put forward."--Abstract

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of North Korea’s nuclear strategies and of the decisions which explain its strategic motivations. The existence of two separate Koreas is an accepted outcome of the current international system. However, in today’s emerging multipolar order, the question of Korean legitimacy remains unresolved and South Korea finds itself surrounded by three nuclear powers— China, Russia, and, de facto, North Korea. This book traces North Korea’s nuclear quest across three major epochs: the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and post- September 11 periods. Through these lenses, the book reveals the underlying drivers of North Korea’s nuclear decisions and strategies, providing evidence that North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not only intended to guarantee the survival of the Kim regime but also hold the key for Pyongyang to resolve the lingering question over Korean legitimacy. The book provides evidence, through a longitudinal case study, that North Korea’s nuclear program provides a means to achieve full sovereign control of the Korean Peninsula by exploiting future opportunities in an increasingly multipolar international order. This book will be of interest to students in the fields of foreign policy, defense policy, nuclear proliferation, Korean Studies and International Relations.

The eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula will send political and economic reverberations throughout Northeast Asia and will catalyze the struggle over a new regional order among the four great powers of the Pacific—Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. Korea’s Future and the Great Powers addresses the vital issues of how to achieve a stable political order in a unified Korea, how to finance Korean economic reconstruction, and how to link Korea into a cooperative framework of international diplomatic relations.

This book offers a case study in foreign policy change: It examines why the Bush administration suddenly redirected its nuclear nonproliferation policy toward North Korea in the aftermath of North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006, abandoning its former confrontational approach in favor of a more accommodating line. Existing explanations of this course reversal draw on the security implications of a growing crisis on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. domestic politics, and changing decision-making dynamics within the Bush administration. Employing before-after comparison, the study refutes these accounts - and it offers an alternative explanation: The Bush administration altered its nonproliferation policy toward North Korea toward a cooperative course because after the nuclear test, it perceived fundamentally improved prospects for fruitful cooperation on North Korea's denuclearization.

To what extent does the failing strategy of nonproliferation pose serious challenges for Northeast Asia's security environment? Are there alternative strategies for managing nuclear weapons in the region? Should the presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia necessarily be seen in exclusively negative terms, as many experts believe?

North Korea's regime has managed to survive in the face of serious internal and external challenges. Kim (political science, Columbia U., US) and Lee (foreign policy and security studies, Sejong Institute, South Korea) present eight essays that address North Korea's system survival strategies in the context of these challenges from a variety of theoretical perspectives, including assymetrical conflict theory, mercantile neorealism, and prospect theory. The papers are organized into three sections that explore the broad theoretical and practical aspects of North Korean-Northeast Asian relations (Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States are the Northeast Asian powers for the purposes of this discussion); the global, regional, and national forces that have shaped patterns of conflict and cooperation with the Northeast Asian powers, and the effects of the security and economic domains on system survival strategies. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Analyzing the Korean Peninsula’s contemporary engagement with the Persian Gulf region from the 1950s to the present day, the book begins by asking the following question: What drew Koreans to the region in the first place and under what circumstances were they drawn there? While taking into account a combination of both external and internal factors shaping the dynamics of the Korean Peninsula’s interactions with the Persian Gulf region, this book largely concentrates on the agency factor to analyze the nature and scope of a rather multifaceted relationship between the two areas. The Republic of Korea has, in fact, maintained diverse connections to every single country in the Persian Gulf over the past several decades, and its rather considerable activities and accomplishments in the region all justify such an overwhelming focus. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s record in the Persian Gulf, however, is mostly limited to its relationship with Iran, though Pyongyang has pursued relationships with some other states in the region. This book studies the elements of Pyongyang’s actions in the region as an appendage to South Korea’s various political and economic achievements. Employing a process-tracing approach, this book will be of interest to policymakers, as well as to students and scholars of International Relations, Middle East Studies and Asian Studies.

This book explores the progress in and the obstacles surrounding developing comprehensive security cooperation between Russia and South Korea since diplomatic relations were established in 1991 within the framework of economic security. The book focuses on oil and natural gas projects, linking the Trans-Siberian and Trans-Korean Railroads, industrial development in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone, fishery cooperation, and the arms trade, and examines whether these five aspects of cooperation serve to contribute to building Russian-South Korean bilateral and regional economic security. The author argues that these five aspects of cooperation all have the potential to enhance comprehensive bilateral security and further regional economic security in Northeast Asia. However, Russian-South Korean economic cooperation has been hampered by a number of obstacles, including domestic factors as well as external factors, and prevented Russia and South Korea from fulfilling their potential for creating a cooperative comprehensive security relationship. The author concludes with an assessment on the utility of the concept of multi-dimensional security cooperation as a framework for studying and improving the prospects for Russian-South Korean bilateral relations.