"Constitutes the Terrorism Series' first expansion into non-U.S. legal regimes, and this initial volume deals solely with the UK's approach to security law. Ever since the London bombings of July 7th, 2005, the UK has been faced with the challenge of improving the nation's security while maintaining its proud tradition of civil liberties."--Publisher's website.

This document sets out the United Kingdom's strategy, known as CONTEST, for countering the threat from international terrorism. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom (UK) and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. This is a revised and more detailed version of the strategy contained in "The national security strategy of the United Kingdom" (Cm. 7291, 2008, ISBN 9780101729123). The first part sets the context with a brief history of the changing threat to the United Kingdom and to UK interests overseas from international terrorism, examines the present threat, the factors which are shaping it and the assumptions about how it may develop. The second part sets out the principles which will govern the strategy, including a commitment to human rights and the rule of law, recognition of the need to address the causes as well as the symptoms of terrorism and the need to co-operate with other countries. The four main streams of the CONTEST strategy are: (1) pursue - to stop terrorist attacks; (2) prevent - to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; (3) protect - to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack; (4) prepare - where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact. The third part of the document outlines who will deliver the strategy and how its impact will be measured. The document concludes with a section explaining the importance of communications as a part of the counter-terrorism strategy.

In this report the Foreign Affairs Committee calls on the British Government to use its influence to persuade the US to engage more fully, and swiftly, with the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan if the US wishes to disengage its forces there. Although the current international emphasis favours intense military pressure, aimed at defeating the insurgency, it is clear that military pressure alone is not enough to bring security and stability to Afghanistan. The evidence presented to the Committee has suggested that the current full-scale and highly-intensive ISAF counter-insurgency campaign is not succeeding. The Committee question the fundamental assumption that success in Afghanistan can be 'bought' through a strategy of 'clear, hold and build'. The distinction between al-Qaeda and the Taliban is crucial to generating appropriate policy responses in Afghanistan. The Committee says that despite the significant resources that have been invested in Afghanistan, and the enduring, wholehearted and admirable commitment and sacrifices of British personnel, the UK has not yet achieved its stated goals. There is also evidence that the core foreign policy justification for the UK's continued presence in Afghanistan, namely that it is necessary in the interests of UK national security, may have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The security rationale behind the UK Government's decision to announce the 2015 deadline for the unconditional withdrawal of UK combat forces remains unclear and there are a number of potential risks inherent in such an approach.

Terrorism seems to have developed as a world-wide virus causing harm and destruction where ever it turns up and turning up at unexpected places as no doubt all viruses are intended to do. The attackers seek weaknesses in the target countries and the target countries seek defences and deterrents against the attackers. This new book highlights some of the anti-terrorist actions underway.

This authoritative companion brings together the learning of the first decade since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, drawing on the personal and professional foresight of key individuals identifying future challenges that still lie ahead in the decades yet to come.

Prevent Strategy is a collection of work from practitioners – youth workers and the police – and academics researching Prevent. This book examines overcoming the stigma attached to Prevent being implicitly racist, problems related to the section 26 duty, training staff on Prevent, creating safe spaces to have open discussions, problems regarding extremists’ online activity, and the law surrounding freedom of expression. Since its introduction, the UK’s Prevent strategy has been surrounded with controversy ranging from making the Muslim community a dangerous ‘suspect community’ to being another layer of police surveillance on individuals who have not been arrested or convicted of a crime. Despite amendments to the strategy – which now covers all forms of extremism – and adopting a multi-agency approach, these suspicions remain, exacerbated by the section 26 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 duty on specified authorities to prevent vulnerable people being drawn towards terrorism. This book's findings on the Prevent strategy will be an invaluable tool for staff in education, the health service, and the criminal justice agencies who carry out the section 26 duty. It will also appeal to academics and students studying the area of terrorism and security.

The spectre and fear of another terrorist attack looms large for most of the world's citizenry and for the domestic law agencies charged with protecting these citizens and countries. This book explores how various countries have dealt with or are dealing with homeland security in the aftermath of terrorist attacks such as 9/11, the underground tube attacks in London in 2005, the Madrid train bombing in Spain, and compares global approaches and lessons to the US and the world. This unique study looks at homeland security law and policy utilizing a comparative analysis methodology ideal for those interested in law and security.

Exclusion from refugee status for the suspected commission of serious crimes is a topic fraught with political and legal controversy. This is an area which sees the intersection of refugee law with international criminal and humanitarian law and, increasingly, measures taken in the fight against terrorism. In Terrorism and Exclusion from Refugee Status in the UK, Sarah Singer examines whether and how ‘terrorism’ has featured in the UK’s interpretation and application of the Refugee Convention’s ‘exclusion clause’. A number of sources are drawn on including questionnaires and interviews conducted with immigration judges, the Home Office’s exclusion unit and legal practitioners. She therefore provides an unprecedented and thorough analysis of the UK’s approach to asylum seekers suspected of serious criminality.

This document presents the first annual report on the work done in 2009-10 by Government departments and agencies under the United Kingdom's strategy, known as CONTEST, for countering the threat from international terrorism. The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. The report sets out the strategic context and details the response under the pursue, prevent, protect and prepare headings, and with a separate section on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cross-cutting issues covered include: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and explosives; Olympic safety and security programme; communications.

This book examines de-radicalisation policy in the UK and addresses the contradictions evident in the conceptualisation and practice of de-radicalisation. It explores three main themes that touch upon some of the most pressing issues of our day: security, identity and religion. Situated within the Prevent strand of the UK Counter-Terrorism policy and administered by the police through the ‘Channel Programme’, policymakers have promoted de-radicalisation as a vital instrument in the fight against terrorism. Despite the political and legal importance of de-radicalisation as an instrument of counter-terrorism, we continue to know very little about the programme and the profile of individuals who have been de-radicalised, as well as having little or no access to data on the programme. There is also a glaring lacuna in the wider literature regarding the concept, theory, and evidence base for de-radicalisation policies. This book addresses this lacuna and, with the use of data collected from interviews conducted with 27 practitioners, this work reveals the existence of multiple conceptions of de-radicalisation and a number of conceptual features unique to the UK context. Subsequently, the book proposes that de-radicalisation in the UK would be best conceptualised as ‘technologies of the self’. Seen in this way, de-radicalisation is less about tackling terrorism and radicalisation and more about the re-configuring of citizenship, the construction of a mainstream British identity, and the promotion of certain subjectivities in an era of uncertainty about British political identity. This book will be of much interest to students of critical terrorism studies, de-radicalisation, counter-terrorism, UK politics and security studies in general.