This report analyses MoD's annual report and accounts 2004-05 (published in October 2005 - later than planned - as HC 464, session 2005-06, ISBN 0102935424) which combines MoD's annual performance report and the consolidated departmental resource accounts. Overall MoD's performance against its seven Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets has been mixed: three were "met", two were "partly met", one was "on course" to be met, and one was "not yet assessed". On recruitment and retention (partly met) all three armed services are suffering from critical shortages in various specialist trades, including aircrew and medical personnel. Although MoD reported £400m of savings in the operating costs of the Defence Logistics Organisation, the Committee criticizes the fact that not all of them could be validated. On procurement, MoD did not meet the targets relating to project time slippage. Cost decreases of £699 million were reported on the top 20 major defence equipment projects, but much of this was a result of cuts in the numbers of equipment ordered or in the capability of equipment. Losses reported in MoD's Financial Accounts totalled some £400 million, a lower figure than the previous year but still a substantial sum. Reported losses on the Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) programme, which involves the procurement of four transport ships, were some £100 million and further losses might arise. Another loss totalling £147 million related to a building project at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston. The building was unable to meet the requirement and no other use could be found for it. It is another example of substantial waste which has to avoided in the future.

This report analyses the Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (published as HC 697, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780102946369). The MoD's assessment of its expected achievements against its six Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets, which run until the end of March 2008, has deteriorated since the previous year's Annual Report and Accounts. At the end of 2007, the MoD did not expect to meet the target relating to generating forces and expects "only partly" to meet targets relating to recruitment and retention, and defence equipment procurement. The failure to meet the target for generating forces is a consequence of the continuing high levels of deployment of the Armed Forces. The Committee is concerned that the Armed Forces have been operating at or above the level of concurrent operations they are resourced and structured to deliver for seven of the last eight years, and for every year since 2002. Achieving manning balance in all three Service continues to be a challenge. Shortages remain within many specialist trades in all three Armed Services, but especially in the Army Medical Service. The report notes the failure to meet harmony guidelines in the Army and the Royal Air Force - another indicator of the pressure on the Armed Forces from the continuing high level of operations - and another target missed by all three services is for ethnic minority recruitment. The MoD continues to experience substantial forecast cost increases on equipment programmes, and the report notes delays in delivering equipment programmes to the planned in-service dates. The MoD faces difficult choices in the face of expected cuts in the defence programme and the management of a streamlining exercise to reduce civilian posts in the headquarters.

The Ministry of Defence needs the capability to transport personnel, equipment and stores from the UK to operational theatres across the globe. This capability, known as Strategic Lift, can by delivered by sea, land or air, and its annual cost to the MoD is almost £800 million a year. The Committee's report examines the progress of the MoD in delivering the Strategic Lift requirements set out in the Strategic Defence Review and whether these requirements need to be revisited given the experience of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Findings include that good progress has been made in improving strategic sea-lift, particularly in relation to Ro-Ro ships and the acquisition of Landing Platform Dock (Auxiliary) vessels. However, strategic air-lift is a particular concern given the age of many of the aircraft, and the report looks at the progress of two major equipment programmes designed to deliver new transport aircraft (the A400M transport aircraft) and new tanker aircraft (the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft).

future of the UK's strategic nuclear Deterrent : The White Paper, ninth report of session 2006-07, Vol. 2: Oral and written Evidence

On 23 March 2007 15 Royal Navy personnel from HMS Cornwall were captured by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard while conducting a boarding operation on a merchant vessel in shallow waters near the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, between Iraq and Iran. They were taken to Iran, paraded before the international media and detained until their release and return home on 5 April. On their return, the Royal Navy staged a press conference for some of the detainees: two of them subsequently sold their stories to the media. Lt General Sir Rob Fulton was appointed to inquire into the operational circumstances and factors leading to the capture of the Royal Navy personnel. His report was confidential and not published but the Defence Committee was allowed to see it to ensure Parliamentary scrutiny. The Committee reports that Fulton robustly identified serious weaknesses in intelligence, communications, doctrine and training. Whilst there were insufficient grounds for courts martial, formal administrative action has been taken against a number of Service personnel. The Government has made good progress towards implementing Fulton's recommendations. The Committee also considered the findings of the Hall report into media access to Service personnel (available at www.mod.uk). The decision to allow the Service personnel to sell their stories was a serious mistake and deeply damaging to the reputation of the Royal Navy. The Secretary of State for Defence has accepted responsibility and apologised. This should not absolve others from blame.

This report sets out the work of the Committee during 2007. The report highlights aspects of the Committee's working practices which depart from previous practice or which may otherwise be of interest. In particular it draws attention to the webforum held during its inquiry into Medical Care for the Armed Forces; its taking of evidence outside Westminster, in Birmingham and Edinburgh; and the growing amount of informal activities of the Committee. It also underlines the importance of visits to the Armed Forces on operational deployments. Whilst the MoD was commended for overall timeliness in responding to the Committee's inquiries, in one inquiry: 'UK Defence: commitments and resources'; there was a delay which hindered the progress of the Committee

This report is in response to the Government's reply to the Committee's May 2009 Report on the Defence contribution to national security and resilience. The Committee is disappointed with the content of the Government's response to its earlier Report, and challenges the Ministry of Defence to be more open in setting out its role in contributing to the nation's security. In this Report, the Committee: calls upon the Government to provide regular updates on national security to appropriate select committees; deplores the Government's failure so far to establish a Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy following the announcement of July 2008; and stresses the importance of the forthcoming defence Green Paper and Strategic Defence Review in making the necessary and important connections between national security and strategic defence capabilities. The next Government must spell out more clearly the role of the UK's defence assets in our national security.

This book explores the process by which defence policy is made in contemporary Britain and the institutions, actors and conflicting interests which interact in its inception and continuous reformulation. Rather than dealing with the substance of defence policy, this study focuses upon the institutional actors involved in this process. This is a subject which has commanded far more interest from public, Parliament, government and the armed forces since the protracted, bloody and ultimately unsuccessful British military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The work begins with a discussion of two contextual factors shaping policy. The first relates to the impact of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over defence and intelligence matters, while the second considers the impact of Britain’s relatively disappointing economic performance upon the funding of British defence since 1945. It then goes on to explore the role and impact of all the key policy actors, from the Prime Minister, Cabinet and core executive, to the Ministry of Defence and its relations with the broader ‘Whitehall village’, and the Foreign Office and Treasury in particular. The work concludes by examining the increasing influence of external policy actors and forces, such as Parliament, the courts, political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. This book will be of much interest to students of British defence policy, security studies, and contemporary military history.

The defence industrial strategy published in December 2005 (Command paper Cm. 6697, ISBN 0101669720). Its aim was to provide greater transparency on the UK's future defence requirements and to set out those industrial capabilities the UK needs to maintain appropriate sovereignty and operate equipment independently. The Committee praises the production of the strategy to a tight timetable and with wide consultation. The strategy has been well received by industry. In the future there will be more focus on upgrading and maintaining platforms rather than designing and building new equipment. The Committee wants the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to continue improvements in the procurement process, and to give more information about future requirements. Investment in research and technology needs to increase, or the result will be lower quality defence equipment. The MoD also needs to develop a greater understanding of the vital role of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain. Competitive procurement will not always be possible in some areas, where there is only a single company with the capacity and capability to deliver the MoD's requirements. The Committee expresses concerns about the planned use of long-term partnering arrangements, seeing the risk of possible monopoly supply and lack of access of other companies to sub-contract work.

In March 2008 the Government published "The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world" (NSS) (Cm. 7291, 2008, ISBN 9780101729123). Part dealt with the contribution of the armed forces to the overarching security policy of the UK, and the Defence Committee set out to examine "how the MoD and the Armed Forces interact with other departments and agencies to ensure the safety and security of the UK". The report looks at the developing area of Parliamentary scrutiny of national security, welcomes the proposed creation of a Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, but does question which minister will give evidence to that Committee. The vital role of the ministry of Defence is outlined, and the contribution must be appropriately understood, directed and resourced. The Committee recommends that the Government investigate how the Territorial Army could be used in civil emergencies, rather than always resorting to regular troops. It is essential that all activity relating to national security is appropriately funded from an indicative national security budget. The NSS should also make a clearer connection between the strategy and industry, and the Committee welcomes the Government's engagement with the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community. Current issues examined include: the London 2012 Olympic Games; maritime security - the Committee comments on only six Royal Navy ships being dedicated to this, and the level of action taken to address identified threats to aspects of critical infrastructure such as ports; the impact of current operations and the extent to which UK forces are stretched or overstretched.